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Criminal Law: Miranda Warning
Required in Tax Investigation
Defendant was subjected to a tax audit while serving a
prison sentence for an unconnected offense. During two inter-
views with a revenue agent, he identified his tax returns for
the years in question and signed voluntary extensions of the
statute of limitations for deficiency claims.1 The revenue
agent later found indications of fraud and referred the case to
the Intelligence Division, which handles criminal matters aris-
ing in the course of such investigations. A special agent inter-
viewed the defendant and apprised him of the criminal aspects
of the pending investigation and of his constitutional rights.2
Defendant refused to cooperate further. At the trial, evidence
given to the revenue agent was admitted over objection, and
the defendant was convicted of willfully filing false claims for
tax refunds. The Fifth Circuit upheld the conviction3 but the
Supreme Court reversed, holding, that a taxpayer in custody is
entitled to Miranda warnings prior to questioning by an Inter-
nal Revenue agent regarding an audit of his tax return. Mathis
v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
An audit or "routine tax investigation" is conducted by a
revenue agent and is designed to determine whether the tax-
payer has correctly computed his tax liability. If the audit re-
veals indications of fraud, the revenue agent refers the case to
the Intelligence Division, whose agents, known as "special
agents," are law enforcement officers concerned only with the
criminal potential of the case. If the special agent's investi-
gation convinces the Intelligence Division of the taxpayer's guilt,
he will be formally charged and prosecuted under federal crim-
inal statutes.
The Mathis case raises the problem of the applicability of
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the
1. Form 872, known as "Consent fixing period of limitation upon
assessment of income and profits tax." 6 CCH 1969 STAND. FED. TAX
REP. 6044.
2. The majority opinion does not refer to the special agent, but
Justice White, in his dissent, indicates that the special agent gave Mathis
a "full set of 'Miranda warnings."' 391 U.S. 1, 6 n.2. Note, however,
that this interview occurred on June 9, 1965, more than a year before
Miranda was handed down.
3. 376 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1967).
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sixth amendment right to counsel in tax investigations. Its solu-
tion depends on an interpretation of the principles enunciated
in the landmark cases of Escobedo v. Illinois4 and Miranda v.
Arizona.5 Most pre-Escobedo cases that dealt with taxpayers'
rights were concerned with the constitutional significance of de-
ceit or misrepresentation on the part of investigating agents.
Generally, the courts held that the fourth and fifth amend-
ments require special agents to refrain from the type of conduct
that would be affirmatively misleading, but that mere failure to
inform the taxpayer of the criminal nature of the investigation
did not amount to a constitutional violation.6 Escobedo and
Miranda attempted to define the nature and scope of an ac-
cused person's constitutional rights, the point at which they at-
tach, and the procedure which must be followed in order to
insure their protection. Thus Escobedo says that police must
issue warnings to a person being questioned when he has be-
come the "focus" of an "inquiry into an unsolved crime."
Miranda set out a specific four point warning s which must pre-
cede the interrogation of any person who is under custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way.0
Since these two cases were concerned with the preservation of
an accused's constitutional right to refrain from self-incrimina-
tion,10 they do not apply to non-criminal investigations.
4. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
5. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6 See Hewitt, The Constitutional Rights of the Taxpayer in a
Fraud Investigation, 44 TAXES 660, 664 (1966).
7. The language of the opinion is as follows:
We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun
to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into
police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations
that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect
has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with
his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of
his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused
has been denied "the Assistance of Counsel" in violation of the
Sixth Amendment of the Constitution....
378 U.S. at 490-91.
8. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the
right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against
him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of
an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will
be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
384 U.S. at 479.
9. [W] e hold that when an individual is taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any
significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege
against self-incrimination is jeopardized.
Id. at 478.
10. The Escobedo ruling is actually based upon the sixth amend-
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The applicability of Miranda and Escobedo in the tax con-
text is troublesome because of the difficulty in distinguishing
between the civil and criminal aspects of tax investigations.
The audit itself has always been regarded as a civil investiga-
tion, which may or may not lead to a civil action for collection
of a tax deficiency."1 The fraud investigation, which fre-
quently begins as a civil audit, looks toward criminal prosecu-
tion of the taxpayer. 2 Most courts, however, have shown
reluctance to apply the Escobedo and Miranda principles to in-
vestigations of tax crimes.'3  In Kohatsu v. United States,'14
the court said that the Escobedo principles did not require even
special agents to issue warnings to the taxpayer, reasoning that
their investigation could not properly be termed an "inquiry
into an unsolved crime," but was actually an attempt to discover
whether a crime had in fact been committed.15 This distinc-
tion was criticized by writers and some courts,' 6 on the
ground that it raised a meaningless difference to constitutional
significance, and that it ignored the fact that the taxpayer in a
fraud investigation is actually a criminal suspect.'7 Nonethe-
less, the Kohatsu reasoning prevailed in most courts. 8
ment right to counsel, but the opinion clearly reflects the Court's aware-
ness of the interrelationship between the fifth and sixth amendment
rights. See 378 U.S. at 485, 487, 488-90.
11. See Frohmann v. United States, 380 F.2d 832 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 976 (1967); Kohatsu v. United States, 351 F.2d 898, (9th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1011 (1966); United States v. Gower,
271 F. Supp. 655 (M.D. Pa. 1967). The above cases differ on the issue
of whether the special agent should be considered a criminal investigator
required to give Miranda warnings.
12. See Hewitt, supra note 6, at 662, 683. The author asserts that
the functions of a special agent compare in all essential respects to
those of an FBI agent or any other law enforcement officer.
13. See cases cited note 11 supra.
14. 351 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1965).
15. Id. at 901.
16. See cases cited note 37 infra.
17. See Hewitt, supra note 6. Attacking the constitutional sig-
nificance of the distinction, he notes that to accord a taxpayer constitu-
tional protection only after the existence of the crime has been proven
is to accord him no protection whatever, since at that point his guilt is
also conclusively proven. Id. at 694. The distinction is also criticized
as baseless since in many ordinary criminal cases the existence of the
criminal act itself is determined by the trier of fact. Comment, The
Constitutional Right to Counsel in a Tax Investigation, 33 U. CHI. L.
REv. 134, 140 (1965). See also Lay, The Right to Counsel in a Criminal
Tax Investigation, 43 Lm. L.J. 69 (1967); Comment, Constitutional Rights
of the Taxpayer in a Tax Fraud Investigation, 42 Tui. L. REv, 862
(1968).
18. Kohatsu was a case of first impression in the appellate courts;
other circuits have since concurred. See, e.g., Taglianetti v. United States,
1969] 1337
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By rejecting the Kohatsu holding, the Supreme Court
viewed Mathis as a man in custody giving incriminating evidence
to officers. 19 He was therefore entitled to be warned of his
right to remain silent and of his right to counsel. 20  The
Court noted that although tax investigations may differ from
other criminal investigations in that they usually lead only to
civil actions, there is always the possibility that a criminal prose-
cution will result from the audit.21 The Court also held that
Miranda does not require that a defendant's custody be directly
related to the matter under investigation.22  Thus, the fact
that Mathis' custody was unrelated to the tax matter was im-
material.
The Mathis holding apparently broadens the concept of
"custodial interrogation." The Miranda opinion emphasized the
repugnancy of using stationhouse interrogation techniques to
coerce confessions.23 Stationhouse interrogation, therefore, had
to be preceded by a warning sufficient to apprise the suspect of
his rights. In Mathis, the majority found that the facts war-
ranted application of the Miranda rule despite seemingly mate-
rial differences in the custodial settings of the two cases.
Unlike Miranda, Mathis was interviewed in familiar surround-
ings, was not held captive by his interrogators, and was ques-
tioned by a tax auditor rather than a number of police officers.
It seems reasonable to say that a man in Mathis' position would
398 F.2d 558 (1st Cir. 1968); United States v. Squeri, 398 F.2d 795 (2d
Cir. 1968); Frohmann v. United States, 380 F.2d 832 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 976 (1967); United States v. Mancuso, 378 F.2d 612 (4th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 955 (1968); Mathis v. United States, 376
F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1967).
The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly reaffirmed its Kohatsu ruling.
Freichtmeir v. United States, 389 F.2d 498 (9th Cir. 1968). In Whitfield
v. United States, 376 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1967), when faced with a direct
and open challenge to the Kohatsu reasoning, the court disposed of the
case on the ground that defendant's trial had begun prior to the Miranda
ruling and the warnings given him were sufficient at that time. See
Rickey v. United States, 360 F.2d 32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 835(1966).
19. 391 U.S. at 3.
20. Id. at 5.
21. Id. at 4.
22. Id. at 5.
23. Hewitt, supra note 6, also draws a number of parallels between
the police procedures reviewed in Miranda and the practices employed
by the special agents. In both cases, it is said, the officers strive to get
their suspect alone, wear him down through constant questioning, "har-
assing," or "haranguing," cultivate the suspect's impression that his guilt
has been confirmed and that he has no choice but to cooperate, and
finally, to stifle any desire he may have to exercise the privilege to
remain silent. Hewitt, supra note 6, at 683.
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be far less psychologically vulnerable than Miranda's hypotheti-
cal suspect, who is suddenly apprehended by the police and taken
from familiar surroundings to police headquarters for question-
ing.24 The Mathis Court rejected this line of reasoning by
cautioning that the justification behind the Miranda decision
should not be confused with the holding of the case. The Court
apparently saw no need to discuss the presence or absence of a
"coercive influence" in Mathis' surroundings but instead quoted
a broad statement of the Miranda rule which refers not to coer-
cion but only to custody.25
The Court also abruptly rejected the Government's argu-
ment that Miranda only applies to the questioning of a suspect
who is in custody in connection with the matter under investi-
gation.20 The Court may have feared that this position would
allow police to escape the Miranda rule by manipulating the
charges brought against arrested persons, either by misstating
the real reason for the arrest or by obtaining custody on any
available grounds in order to question the person on another
matter. On balance, however, it seems more likely that the
Supreme Court simply did not desire to limit its Miranda rule.
The important language in Miranda, it would then seem, is that
which indicates that custody must be considered as inherently
and presumptively coercive.27
24. This is the position taken by the dissent, in which Justices
White, Harlan and Stewart joined. 391 U.S. at 7.
25. See note 9 supra.
26. The Government also seeks to narrow the scope of the
Miranda holding by making it applicable only to questioning one
who is "in custody" in connection with the very case under
investigation. There is no substance to such a distinction, and
in effect it goes against the whole purpose of the Miranda deci-
sion which was designed to give meaningful protection to Fifth
Amendment rights. We find nothing in the Miranda opinion
which calls for a curtailment of the warnings to be given per-
sons under interrogation by officers based on the reason why the
person is in custody.
391 U.S. at 4-5.
This same interpretation had previously been reached in United
States v. Harrison, 265 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (facts directly on
point with Mathis) and again in People v. McFall, 66 Cal. Rptr. 277 (Ct.
App. 1968) (defendant arrested for forgery and subsequently interro-
gated about a car theft). See also People v. Chavez, 68 Cal. Rptr. 759
(Ct. App. 1968) (stating that "custodial interrogation" rather than the
"focusing" of an investigation is the crucial element in Miranda).
27. Several parts of the Miranda opinion itself strongly suggested
that this emphasis would be forthcoming:
Even without employing brutality, the "third degree" or the
specific stratagems described above, the very fact of custodial
interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades
on the weakness of individuals.
19691 1339
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This view of Miranda is consistent with a number of lower
court interpretations. Thus, Miranda has been read as stating
that custody may result when a person reasonably believes that
his freedom of action has been significantly restricted.28 Some
courts have broadened the "custodial interrogation" concept by
finding that custody may result when a person is interrogated
in the office of the investigator 29 or even in his own home.30
In these situations the psychological pressures employed by the
interrogator may determine custody either by inducing a person
to believe that his freedom has been curtailed or by coercing
incriminating evidence from him.31 Such cases emphasize the
effect of the interrogation situation on the accused person's own
conception of his freedom of action, rather than any demon-
strable physical restraint. Between these cases and the in-cus-
tody cases like Miranda and Mathis there runs a strong common
thread: Custody results from the operation of factors which
tend to render self-incriminating testimony less than purely vol-
untary.
The most significant effects of Mathis will probably be felt
outside the prison or stationhouse walls since it affirms the ap-
plicability of the Miranda precepts to the area of tax investiga-
tions.32  The Supreme Court apparently assumed that as a
384 U.S. at 455 (emphasis added).
Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the
compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement
obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free
choice.
384 U.S. at 458 (emphasis added). See also note 26 supra; People v.
Ellingson, 65 Cal. Rptr. 744 (Ct. App. 1968) (the court, dealing with a
police interrogation, said there is no distinction between the accusatory
and investigatory stages of an in-custody interrogation).
28. People v. Ellingson, 65 Cal. Rptr. 744 (Ct. App. 1968); People
v. P., 21 N.Y. 2d 1, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225 (Ct. App. 1967); Commonwealth v.
Sites, 427 Pa. 486, 235 A.2d 387 (1967).
29. See United States v. Gower, 271 F. Supp. 655 (M.D. Pa. 1967);
People v. Accavallo, 57 Misc. 2d 264, 291 N.Y.S.2d 972 (Nassau County
Ct. 1968).
30. See Commonwealth v. Sites, 427 Pa. 486, 235 A.2d 387 (1967)
(defendant, suspected of murder, was found to be in the custody of
police when escorted from a relative's home to his own home for inter-
rogation).
31. See cases cited notes 28 & 29 supra.
32. In White v. United States, 395 F.2d 170 (8th Cir. 1968) the
court, referring to Mathis, said:
This decision extends the Miranda precepts to the area of civil
tax investigations and holds that under appropriate circum-
stances the warnings must be given prior to interrogation by the
investigating agents.
395 U.S. at 173. In distinguishing Mathis, the court noted that the
revenue agent had interviewed the taxpayer at his place of business
1340 [Vol. 53:1335
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practical matter the civil and criminal aspects of tax investi-
gations are inseparable. It appears that the auditor actually
functions as a preliminary investigator in a fraud case. He
evaluates any incriminating evidence he discovers and decides
whether to call in special agents. Evidence given to the audi-
tor is admitted in criminal trials and all audits carry the pos-
sibility that a criminal prosecution may result. Seemingly,
to the extent that a tax investigation is a criminal matter, the
taxpayer deserves meaningful protection of his constitutional
rights, including his privilege against involuntary self-incrim-
ination.
In recognizing that a tax investigation incorporates some
criminal features from the very outset, Mathis devitalizes the
widely accepted Kohatsu distinction that a tax investigation
differs for constitutional purposes from the investigation of an
unsolved crime. This distinction had blocked a number of courts
from applying the Miranda principles to tax fraud investiga-
tions,33 although a growing number of writers and judges34
were unable to see why a tax fraud investigation should be
regarded as anything but a purely criminal matter. Also, by
treating the auditor as a quasi-criminal investigator, the Mathis
Court refused to allow the Internal Revenue Service to deter-
mine for itself the criminal or civil status of its investigations.
The significance of this point lies in the fact that a taxpayer
suspected of fraud is unlikely to flee to avoid prosecution, con-
stitutes no immediate danger to society, and is readily available
to the investigating agents. Moreover, the Internal Revenue
Service is free to conduct its investigations in its own manner
and at its own pace. To allow tax agents to determine the civil
or criminal status of their investigations would permit them to
decide for their own convenience the point at which a tax-
payer's constitutional rights should attach.35
and had made a constant and conscientious effort to inform him of the
relevant provisions of the law, and that the taxpayer appeared to under-
stand fully the nature of the proceeding and to cooperate willingly. The
pains the court took to distinguish Mathis may be an indication of how
broad that holding is.
Nothing in the Mathis reasoning suggests that it need apply only to
tax investigations. Mathis should apply to any civil investigation which
by its nature might lead to a criminal prosecution. See People v. Acca-
vallo, 57 Misc. 2d 264, 291 N.Y.S.2d 972 (Nassau County Ct. 1968) (hold-
ing Mathis applicable to an investigation by state labor officials).
33. See cases cited note 18 supra.
34. See articles cited note 17 supra, and cases cited note 37 infra.
35. Hewitt includes a well-developed discussion of these points in
his article. Hewitt, supra note 6, at 660.
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It seems clear, however, that treating the taxpayer as a
criminal suspect will not in itself assure that he will be ade-
quately warned of his constitutional rights. Mathis only applies
when the taxpayer is in some form of custody. But the peculiar
nature of the tax investigation indicates that he should be en-
titled to constitutional warnings at the point in the investigation
when the danger arises that he may be coerced into making
self-incriminating statements. According to Miranda, this
danger arises in the ordinary criminal case when the suspect is
taken into custody and interrogated. But a tax investigation
differs in that it is often conducted in the home or business
office by men not easily recognized as police. As previously
noted, custody in this context does not play the same significant
role that it does in other criminal investigations. Indeed, a
taxpayer will not ordinarily be taken into custody unless his
guilt is firmly established, probably on the basis of his own evi-
dence. Custody should not, therefore, be regarded as an appro-
priate prerequisite to the attachment of a taxpayer's constitu-
tional rights. Some other point should be selected, but the
Mathis case does not address this issue.
If one accepts the principles of Miranda, it seems clear that
the taxpayer should be made aware of the true character and
possible consequences of the investigation, and of the availa-
bility of constitutional safeguards well in advance of the cus-
todial stage. A few courts have taken this approach. In United
States v. Turzynski36 the court reasoned that custody is not in
itself constitutionally significant, but rather is evidence of the
beginning of the accusatorial process, the point at which consti-
tutional safeguards must come into play.37 The court observed
36. 268 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
37. The court first discarded the Kohatsu distinction, then noted
that tax fraud investigations, though criminal in nature, are usually
devoid of actual "custody." But the court found a strong parallel be-
tween taking a person into custody, in the ordinary criminal case, and
referring the taxpayer's case to the special agents. In the respective
cases the event marks the beginning of the adversary process, the point
at which the suspect needs to know his constitutional rights. Id. at 853.
This reasoning has persuaded a few courts to reject the Kohatsu rule.
See United States v. Wainwright, 284 F. Supp. 129 (D. Colo. 1968);
United States v. Gower, 271 F. Supp. 655 (M.D. Pa. 1967). See also
Whitfield v. United States, 376 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Kingry, 67-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9262, 19 A.F.T.R. 2d 762 (N.D. Fla. 1967);
United States v. Schoenburg, 19 A.F.T.R. 2d 348 (D. Ariz. 1966).
However, the Second Circuit has specifically rejected the Turzynski
approach. In United States v. Mackiewicz, 401 F.2d 219, cert. denied,
89 S. Ct. 253 (1968), the court rejected the argument that an investi-
gation shifts to the accusatory stage when referred to a special agent,
1342 [Vol. 53:1335
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that in a tax case the beginning of the accusatorial process is
marked clearly by the referral of the case to special agents,
and held that a taxpayer should at that point be entitled to
Miranda warnings.38 United States v. Gower, 9 using a more
conventional approach, held that a taxpayer was in "custody"
for Miranda purposes while answering questions in a special
agent's office.40  Since Mathis does not refer to any of the
leading cases in the tax area, it is not clear which position the
Supreme Court would find persuasive.
Merely by recognizing the criminal nature of a tax investi-
gation, Mathis may force some revision of Internal Revenue
Service procedure. Until recently the Service maintained that
the Escobedo and Miranda principles did not apply to its investi-
gations. 41 A 1967 ruling now requires special agents to identify
themselves immediately as criminal investigators and to issue
further warnings as their investigations proceed. 42  With a
and cited Mathis to illustrate that no formalistic reliance may be
placed on the official title of the investigator. This is a questionable
treatment of the policy behind Mathis, however, and the characteriza-
tion of the Turzynski holding seems somewhat unfair. See also Froh-
mann v. United States, 380 F.2d 832 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 976
(1967).
38. By tying the attachment of constitutional rights to the referral
of the case to the Intelligence Division, rather than to the appearance
of the special agent in the investigation, the court in Turzynski departs
somewhat from one of the main precepts of Miranda-that the warnings
are to precede the questioning of the suspect. Miranda does not require
warnings at the moment a man becomes a suspect. This departure may
be warranted by the fact that in a tax case the initial determination to
institute the shift to a criminal investigation is usually based on evidence
previously supplied, at the government's demand, by the taxpayer. The
taxpayer should be entitled to know of the shift in purpose as soon as it
occurs.
39. 271 F. Supp. 655 (M.D. Pa. 1967).
40. Deprivation of freedom of action cannot be treated sepa-
rately and in isolation, but must be evaluated in the light of
what influence the atmosphere and surroundings of govern-
mental oriented facilities had on the free choice of the person
being interrogated.
Id. at 660. But see United States v. Dawson, 400 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 37 U.S.L.W. 3248 (Jan. 13, 1969).
41. See 33 U. CmI. L. REv. 134, 136 n.7 (1965).
42. The text of that regulation reads:
(A) On initial contact with the taxpayer the special agent is
to produce his credentials and state, "As a special agent
I have the function of investigating the possibility of
criminal tax fraud."
(B) If the potential criminal aspects of the matter are not
resolved by preliminary inquiries and further investiga-
tion becomes necessary, the special agent is required to
advise the taxpayer of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to retain counsel.
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tax investigation now clearly categorized as a criminal matter,
the new ruling should probably be considered constitutionally
inadequate, especially if the Turzynski analysis is followed. An
adequate solution requires a candid disclosure of the nature of
the investigation, both at its inception and as it passes from
one phase to the next. As a practical matter, a letter should be
sent in advance of the audit informing the taxpayer of the
nature of the investigation, the theoretical possibility of a sub-
sequent criminal investigation, the functions of the different
agents, and the taxpayer's constitutional rights.43 Such a pro-
cedure would minimize misunderstanding, protect the rights of
the taxpayer and impose a minimal economic burden on the
Internal Revenue Service. The law should also require a reve-
nue agent, when he finds that he has sufficient grounds to refer
the case to the Intelligence Division, to explain the significance
of that move, and to issue the Miranda warnings himself if he
intends to question the taxpayer further.44 The taxpayer
should be informed again by letter that his case has been re-
ferred for investigation of its criminal potential, that a special
agent will be in contact with him, and that he has a right to
remain silent and to have a lawyer. The special agent should
then identify himself as the criminal investigator and satisfy
himself that the taxpayer has received the Miranda warnings
before proceeding with his questioning. This whole procedure
is simple and straightforward, designed only to insure that the
Internal Revenue Service disclose the true character of its in-
vestigation and how it relates to the taxpayer's rights.
Several conclusions emerge from this analysis of the Mathis
opinion. The Supreme Court shows no intent to restrict the
(C) If it becomes necessary to take the person into custody,
special agents must give a comprehensive statement of
rights before an interrogation. This statement warns a
person in custody that he may remain silent and that
anything he says may be used against him. He is also
told that he has the right to counsel before making a
statement or answering any questions, and that if he
cannot afford counsel he can have one appointed.
United States v. Wainwright, 284 F. Supp. 129, 133 (D. Colo. 1968).
43. Such a procedure is used in Wisconsin. See Lipton & Petrie,
Wisconsin Criminal Tax Fraud Problems, 48 MARQ. L. REv. 1, 7 (1964). It
has also been suggested by a federal court in Grant v. United States,
291 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1961), vacated and remanded to dismiss appeal,
369 U.S. 401 (1962). See 33 U. Cmi. L. REV. 134, 150 n.70 (1965).
44. The primary function of this requirement is to assure a prompt
disclosure to the taxpayer that a formal and structural shift in the
character of the investigation has occurred. A secondary function is to
prevent the auditor from pursuing a criminal investigation, without dis-
closure of the fact, in a case where a referral is clearly warranted.
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Miranda ruling, but has instead extended its reach to certain
types of civil investigations. The most significant impact of the
case will probably be in the area of tax investigations, where
it rejected the previous view that a tax investigation is not a
criminal matter subject to the principles announced in Escobedo
and Miranda. The Court also confirmed the Miranda language
which indicates that physical custody need not arise in connec-
tion with the very matter under investigation. Finally, while
the Mathis case overtly extends the Miranda principles to tax
investigations, it does not decide the point at which the con-
stitutional rights of the taxpayer should attach in an ordinary
tax investigation. An adequate solution to the special problems
presented by tax crime investigations probably requires a re-
vision of the investigating procedures, and it is recommended that
legislative or administrative action be taken along the lines in-
dicated.
Federal Estate Taxation: Loan Secured by Third Party's
Insurance Policy on Decedent's Life Constitutes "Economic
Benefit" to Decedent Under Section 2042(2)
Decedent's wife-executrix claimed that the proceeds from an
insurance policy on the decedent's life, solely owned and irrevo-
cably assigned by her as collateral security for a debt of the
marital community,1 were not includable in decedent's gross
1. In community property states, such as Texas, a debt incurred
by one of the spouses during the marriage becomes a debt of the com-
munity property (marital community), "except in such cases as are
specially excepted by law." Lovejoy v. Cockrell, 63 S.W.2d 1009 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1933); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4620 (1948). But a wife is
not personally liable for the community debts contracted by her husband,
Vinson v. Whitfield, 133 S.W. 1095 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911), nor are her sep-
arate funds legally subject to a community debt. Lush v. Parmer, 114
S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938). Upon the death of one spouse, the sur-
viving spouse takes an undivided one-half interest in the entire estate, not
as an heir, but as an owner, Kreis v. Kreis, 36 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1931), and, by qualifying as community survivor, acquires the
right to manage, control and dispose of both her half and the other
half of the community property. Patterson v. Twaddell, 301 S.W.2d 680
(Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
In Prichard v. United States, 397 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1968), there-
fore, the Commissioner allowed the wife-executrix to claim one-half
the community debt as a debt of decedent's estate and included one-half
the proceeds of the insurance policy in decedent's gross estate. In-
clusion of only one-half the policy proceeds was apparently based on
the theory that since possession of incidents of ownership by the hus-
band arose from the economic benefits of the policy-secured a com-
134519691
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estate. The district court disagreed, holding the proceeds in-
cludable in decedent's estate under section 2042(1),2 since they
were to pay a debt owed by his estate, and includable under
section 2042 (2) 3 since decedent "possessed incidents of owner-
ship" thereunder. Affirming on other grounds,4 the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that although decedent's wife was the sole owner of
the insurance policy, decedent's involvement in its purchase and
assignment, and his continued enjoyment of the economic bene-
fits of the loan secured thereby, up to the time of his death,
required inclusion of one-half5 the proceeds in his estate under
section 2042 (2). Prichard v. United States, 397 F.2d 60 (5th Cir.
1968).
Whereas the federal estate tax law directs that when the
proceeds of life insurance policies are "receivable by the execu-
tor," such amounts are to be included in the gross estate of the
decedent under section 2042(1), 6 the sole criterion for inclu-
sion of those proceeds not "receivable by the executor" is
whether "the decedent possessed at his death any of the inci-
dents of ownership." 7  Whether the proceeds are "receivable
by the executor," or the decedent had "incidents of ownership"
at death, is determined on the basis of local law.8 Thus, the
question of whether an insurance policy is the separate property
munity debt which allowed him to purchase additional community prop-
erty-he only held incidents of ownership over one-half the value of
the policy at his death.
2. Prichard v. United States, 255 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
3. [I]n assigning the policy involved herein as security for a
loan made contingent on the application for the policy and its
assignment, [decedent] possessed incidents of ownership in the
policy making the proceeds includable in his estate under the
provisions of section 2042....
Id. at 554.
4. The court, finding one-half the proceeds includable in the gross
estate of the decedent under section 2042 (2), refused to consider whether
section 2042(1) was applicable despite its being the main ground
upon which the district court relied.
5. See note 1 supra.
6. INT. REv.CODE Of1954, § 2042(1).
7. Id. § 2042:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all
property- . . . (2) Receivable by other beneficiaries.- To
the extent of the amount receivable by all other beneficiaries
as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent with re-
spect to which the decedent possessed at his death any of the
incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone or in conjunc-
tion with any other person.
8. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (5) (1958):
As an additional step in determining whether or not a decedent
possessed any incidents of ownership in a policy or any part of
a policy, regard must be given to the effect of the State or
other applicable law upon the terms of the policy.
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of a spouse in a community property state is determined by state
law, as is the question of a spouse's control over insurance
policies he or she "owns."9
The test of "receivable by the executor" under section 2042
(1) is whether the proceeds are receivable for administration
and distribution as an asset of the estate.' 0 Even where life
insurance proceeds are payable to the executor, courts hold them
not includable in decedent's estate if the executor is bound either
by the terms of the policy or by state law to pass the proceeds
directly to named beneficiaries." However, where the insurance
proceeds are payable to a trustee who is required to apply them
in payment of debts or obligations of the insured's estate, they
are deemed, to the extent so expended, to be "receivable by
the executor" under section 2042 (1) .12
Although the "incidents of ownership" test was judicially
applied as early as 1929,13 and promulgated in the Treasury
Regulations in 1934,14 it was not incorporated into the statutory
scheme until 1942.15 The predecessor of section 2042(2) then
contained a two-pronged criterion for including life insurance
proceeds in a decedent's estate: the payment of premiums by
9. Whereas the general rule in Texas was that the husband was
deemed to be the agent and manager of all community property, Texas
law now grants joint management rights to the spouses in community
property. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. AN. art. 4621 (Supp. 1968).
10. Proutt's Estate v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 591, 593 (6th Cir.
1942).
11. Flick's Estate v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1948);
Commissioner v. Jones, 62 F.2d 496 (6th Cir. 1932).
12. See, e.g., Hooper v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 114 (A & NA)
(1940); Rohnert v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 1319 (1939). In Old Colony
Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 871 (A & NA) (1939), the court
held that insurance policy proceeds payable to a trustee who was au-
thorized, but not legally bound, to pay debts and charges against the
insured's estate were not "receivable by the executor" on the grounds
that the obligation to pay the estate's debts must be legally binding on
the other beneficiaries. Id. at 876. Recognizing either explicitly or by
implication that life insurance proceeds which are required to be ap-
plied toward the satisfaction of debts of decedents' estates are to be
dealt with as though "receivable by the executor" under section 2042
(1), many courts have held that whereas the proceeds of the policies in
question were payable to beneficiaries other than the executor, they
nonetheless were to be included in the decedent's gross estate. See,
e.g., Matthews v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 525 (A) (1944); Hofferbert v.
Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 1101 (1942); Mason v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A.
813 (NA) (1941).
13. Chase Natl Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327, 338 (1929).
14. Treas. Reg. 80, §§ 25, 27 (1934).
15. INT. REv. CODE of 1939, § 811(g), as amended, Rev. Act of




the decedent; or his possession at death of "incidents of owner-
ship."'16 The former criterion, however, was dropped in the
enactment of section 2042. Other than the five per cent re-
versionary interest provision of the 1954 Code,1 Congress has
never defined such "incidents of ownership," and this task has
therefore rested with the courts. The regulations, since 1934,
have listed the rights and powers exercisable by the decedent
"either alone or in conjunction with any other person" that
courts have found to be sufficient incidents to warrant in-
clusion in a decedent's estate.'8 These incidents are not re-
stricted to ownership in the technical proprietary sense, but
are based on the right of the insured or his estate to the policy's
economic benefits.' 9
In Prichard, decedent, a Texas resident doing business as a
general contractor, was required by his lender to purchase
a $250,000 life insurance policy 20 as collateral security for per-
manent mortgage financing on a planned shopping center. At
the lender's insistence the decedent placed the policy in his
wife's name.21 At the closing, both decedent and his wife
assigned absolutely the policy proceeds to the lender.22 Despite
16. The Revenue Act of 1942 included in decedent's gross estate
(2) RECEIVABLE BY OTHER BENEFICIARIES.-...
(A) purchased with premiums, or other consideration, paid
directly or indirectly by the decedent ... or (B) with respect
to which the decedent possessed at his death any of the inci-
dents of ownership, exercisable either alone or in conjunction
with any other person.
Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 404(a), 56 Stat. 944.
17. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (3) (1958).
18. E.g., Commissioner v. Noel, 380 U.S. 678, 683 (1965) (the right
to change the beneficiary); Commissioner v. Treganowan, 183 F.2d 288
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853 (1950) (power to surrender or cancel
the policy); Liebmann v. Hassett, 148 F.2d 247 (1st Cir. 1945) (power
to assign the policy); Bowers v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 911 (A) (1955)
(right to receive policy dividends held not a significant incident of
ownership); INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2042(2) (right to a possible re-
version).
19. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (1958).
20. Prichard v. United States, 397 F.2d 60, 61 (5th Cir. 1968).
21. Id. In his initial application decedent designated the lender as
owner and beneficiary.
22. At the time this loan was made, July 7, 1958, the Texas law
of coverture "provided that a married woman could not bind her
separate properly unless she had first obtained a court decree removing
her disability to contract." United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 343
(1966) (emphasis added and footnotes omitted). There is no evidence
in Prichard to suggest that such incapacity to contract was removed by
Mrs. Smith. Great Southern may have sought to overcome this dis-
ability in the wife's assignment by requiring that her husband, the
decedent, also assign the policy as manager of her separate assets.
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a finding that as a matter of Texas law decedent's wife was
complete and sole owner of the policy,23 the court concluded
that until decedent's death, "the insurance policy and the loan
were indispensable parts of an integrated transaction."24 Reti-
cent on the applicability of section 2042(1),25 the court rea-
soned that the legal incidents possessed by the wife were not
controlling since the substance of the transaction was for the
decedent's continuing enjoyment of the policy's economic bene-
fits until his death, and therefore he possessed incidents of
ownership as to one-half the proceeds. 26
Although payment of premiums was dropped as a deter-
minative incident of ownership in the 1954 Code, it has remained
a critical factor in determining whether an insurance policy is
separate or community property in a community property state.
Property purchased by a spouse takes its status at the time of
acquisition, 27 and when purchased with community funds it
"is presumed to be community property even though taken in
the name of only the husband or the wife. '28 As recently as
1967, the Fifth Circuit held in Freedman v. United States2 9 that
where community funds are used to pay the policy premiums
on insurance purchased during the marriage, such insurance
will be characterized as community property.3 0 The court noted
Great Southern may also have felt the insurance policy, despite lan-
guage to the contrary, might be found to be community property, thus
necessitating the husband's assignment.
23. 397 F.2d at 63.
24. Id.
25. The Fifth Circuit may have acknowledged sub silentio the cor-
rectness of one commentator's attack on the district court's inclusion of
the policy proceeds in decedent's estate under § 2042(1). Thies, Prich-
ard Decision Confuses Estate Taxation of Life Insurance Receivable
by the Executor, 25 J. TAX. 291 (1966). Thies persuasively argues that
since there was no evidence that the widow had waived her right of
reimbursement as to her separately held collateral, she would have a
§ 2053 (a) (3) "enforceable 'claim against the estate' for the $250,000
running to the lender" when the lender took that amount of the loaned
assets. Therefore, Thies reasons, decedent's estate had not benefited
from his wife's loan of collateral.
26. The court cited Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331
(1945), for the proposition that they were "bound to give effect to sub-
stance over form." 397 F.2d at 63-64.
27. Reed v. Reed, 283 S.W.2d 311, 314 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
28. Comment, 20 BAYLOR L. REV. 247, 252 (1968). See also Hem-
mingway v. Matthews, 10 Tex. 207 (1853); Huston v. Curl, 8 Tex. 239
(1852).
29. Freedman v. United States, 382 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1967).
30. Appellant in Freedman argued that since the "payment of pre-
miums" test was dropped in 1954, it should not be determinative in any
case. The court brushed the argument aside, stating that,
[w]hile this reasoning seems forceful at first blush, it wilts
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that under such circumstances a gift will not be found merely
because the insured wife designated her husband as "owner,"
for such designation is assumed to be merely for the purpose
of acting as the agent of the community. 31
Thus, before the court in Prichard could determine as a
matter of Texas law that appellant was the sole owner of the
disputed policy, it would have been necessary to find either that
the insurance policy was not purchased with community funds,
or that despite the use of community funds decedent had made
a bona fide gift of the policy to his wife with the subsequent
premiums being paid from her separate assets. The court,
however, failed to address itself to these questions,3 2 noting only
that all negotiations leading up to the policy's purchase were
conducted by decedent.33 Had there been a finding that the
insurance policy was community property, the decedent would
have been deemed to have enjoyed incidents of ownership in
one-half the proceeds at death, rendering unnecessary the court's
strained economic benefits analysis.3'
The circuits appear split on what constitutes "incidents of
ownership" under section 2042. The critical issue in section
2042(2) cases is whether decedent possessed, at his death, any
power to affect the proceeds' disposition. In the recent case of
Commissioner v. Noel,35 the United States Supreme Court stated
that the issue was not whether decedent was in a position to or
ever did exercise a power with respect to the policy, but rather
whether he possessed any legal power to affect the disposition
of the policy.36 The decedent in Noel purchased, in his wife's
presence, $125,000 of life insurance immediately prior to board-
ing an airplane, the policies being given to his wife at his di-
in the face of the proposition that payment with community
funds is important where it results in community owner-
ship. Section 2042 prescribes ownership as the test; and,
according to the Treasury regulations and court decisions, state
law must be considered in determining ownership.
Id. at 748.
31. Id. at 746-47.
32. Prichard v. United States, 397 F.2d 60, 63 (5th Cir. 1968).
33. Id.
34. In Freedman the court discussed the presumption that prop-
erty purchased during the marriage is community property. Freedman
v. United States, 382 F.2d 742, 746-47 (5th Cir. 1967). See also Com-
missioner v. Fleming, 155 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1946); Brick & Tile Inc. v.
Parker, 143 Tex. 383, 186 S.W.2d 66 (1945); Carter v. Barnes, 25 S.W.2d
606 (Tex. Com. App. 1930) (presumption may be rebutted by showing
gift from husband to wife).
35. 380 U.S. 678 (1965).
36. Id. at 684.
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rection and remaining in her possession.3 7 Decedent was killed
when his airplane crashed, and his wife disputed inclusion of the
policies' proceeds in his gross estate on the grounds that the
policies were purchased with her money, given to her, and the
decedent never exercised any rights with respect to them. The
Court held that since the decedent possessed general, legal power
to exercise ownership over the policy, section 2042(2) required
inclusion of the policies' proceeds in decedent's gross estate.3 8
Recently faced with the question of what constituted inci-
dents of ownership, the First Circuit, in United States v. Rhode
Island Hospital Trust Company,39 declared the crucial issue to
be the nature of the decedent's power.40 Stressing the signifi-
cance of Noel,41 the court stated that "[i]n . . . the predecessor
of section 2042, [Congress] was not trying to tax the extent
of the interest of the decedent, '42 but rather "was attempting to
reach ... the power to dispose. . . ,,43 Noting the powers
enumerated in Treasury Regulations, section 20.2042-1 (c) (2),44
the court stated that "it is clear that the reference to ownership
in the 'technical legal sense' is not abandoned and supplanted
by reference to 'economic benefits,'" and that the powers re-
ferred to by Congress in its reports "are powers which may or
may not enrich decedent's estate, but which can affect the
transfer of the policy proceeds." The inquiry then becomes a
matter of determining whether the decedent, at the time of his
death, had "a capacity to do something to affect the disposition
of the policy if he had wanted to."45
The court in Prichard did not frame its inquiry in the
manner suggested in Noel and enunciated in Rhode Island Hos-
37. Id. at 679-80.
38. Id. at 683-84.
39. 355 F.2d 7 (lst Cir. 1966). The court here goes into the ra-
tionale of section 2042(2) in greater detail than any recent case, at-
tempting to place Noel in proper perspective in the process. Id. at 10-11.
40. Id. at 11.
41. Commissioner v. Noel, 380 U.S. 678 (1965).
42. United States v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., 355 F.2d 7,
10 (1st Cir. 1966).
43. Id.
44. For purposes of this paragraph [§ 20.2042-1(c) Receivable
by other beneficiaries], the term "incidents of ownership" is
not limited in its meaning to ownership of the policy in the
technical legal sense. Generally speaking, the term has refer-
ence to the right of the insured or his estate to the economic
benefits of the policy.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (2) (1958).
45. United States v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., 355 F.2d 7,
11 (1st Cir. 1966).
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pital Trust. Rather the court found, in accordance with the
Commissioner's argument, that the life insurance policy was an
essential part of an integrated transaction and that the decedent
continued to enjoy the fruits of that transaction until his death
two years later.46 Thus, the "economic benefit" found in Prich-
ard was twofold: first, that the policy was part of an inte-
grated transaction controlled by the decedent, and the wife's
ownership of the policy was merely a result of that transaction;
and second, that the decedent was enjoying, at the time of his
death, the economic benefits of that earlier transaction.
The holding in Prichard is distinguished, therefore, in find-
ing incidents of ownership possessed by a decedent absent any
finding by the court of a legal power possessed by the decedent
to influence disposition of the policy proceeds. The Fifth Cir-
cuit appears to have supplanted ownership in the "technical
legal sense" with "economic benefits."47  The court's holding
may, however, be narrower than it first appears. The court
states that it is not deciding the case where "a wife who has
become the absolute owner of an insurance policy on her hus-
band's life, her husband no longer having any incidents of owner-
ship therein," assigns "it as collateral for a community debt,"
the husband then commencing to enjoy the economic benefits
of the assignment. 4 Query whether there is any distinction be-
tween that and the instant case other than the nature of the
transaction giving rise to the policy's assignment.49 But the
court may be saying that in the absence of an integrated trans-
action giving rise to the creation and subsequent assignment of
an insurance policy, mere economic benefits will not give rise
to incidents of ownership, absent a showing of some legal power
in the decedent to affect the disposition of the policy proceeds.
While the facts as presented and analyzed by the court pro-
vide little support for the court's conclusions, a different analysis
of the facts in Prichard may provide some justification for the
final result. In Commissioner v. Karagheusian,50 the court held
that a husband's ability to change the ultimate disposition of in-
surance policy proceeds partially funding an inter vivos trust,
with the aid of his wife and daughter, constituted an "incident of
46. 397 F.2d at 64.
47. See note 44 supra, and accompanying text.
48. 397 F.2d at 64.
49. See 397 F.2d at 63 n.5. Approaching the problem from a dif-
ferent direction, the circuit court appears to have duplicated what
they considered error on the part of the district court.
50. 233 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1956).
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ownership." 51  In United States v. Treganowan 52 the Second
Circuit held that where an employee can cancel an insurance
policy on his life by substituting another in his place, such
power is a sufficient incident of ownership to require inclusion
of the proceeds in his gross estate at death.53 Also, Revenue
Ruling 69-5454 states that in the case of group insurance plans a
decedent who had the power to cancel the insurance by termi-
nating his employment will have the proceeds of such policies
included in his gross estate because such a power to cancel is an
incident of ownership with respect to the policy.55 Utilizing this
line of reasoning it can be argued that since the decedent in
Prichard was in a position to affect the disposition of the insur-
ance policy by defaulting on the loan it secured, he possessed
an incident of ownership with respect to the policy.
The Regulations provide that the question of property owner-
ship under section 2042 must be decided on the basis of local law.
Although the premium payment standard of incidents of owner-
ship has been dropped, the source of funds for the payment of
premiums remains critical in the determination of ownership in
community property states. However, no determination as to the
source of premiums was made in the instant case, leaving the
strong presumption in favor of a finding of community prop-
erty unrebutted. If, however, the court was correct in character-
izing the insurance policy as the separate property of the wife-
executrix, the Fifth Circuit's determination of what constitutes
incidents of ownership in an insurance policy seems contrary
to that of the Supreme Court in Noel and that of the First
Circuit as applied in Rhode Island Hospital Trust. The Fifth
Circuit's decision in Prichard arguably constitutes an unwar-
ranted departure from that court's own precedents and the stand-
ards recently announced by the Supreme Court.
51. Id. at 199. In Karagheusian the wife, who owned an insur-
ance policy on her husband's life, established an inter vivos trust and
absolutely assigned the insurance policy to the corporate trustee along
with other securities. The trust agreement was later amended to pro-
vide that the wife could, with the written consent of her husband and
daughter, modify, alter or revoke the trust in whole or in part. Id. at
198-99.
52. 183 F.2d 288 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853 (1950).
53. In Treganowan decedent had held a seat on the New York
Stock Exchange which entitled him to valuable retirement and death
benefits. Decedent had "the power to sell his seat, thus divesting his
beneficiary of any right to payments ... ." Id. at 292.
54. Rev. Rul. 69-54, 1969 INT. REV. BuLL. No. 6, at 20, superseding




Federal Income Taxation: Bad Debt Reserve
Restored to Income in Section 351 Transfer
Petitioner transferred the entire business of his sole pro-
prietorship, including the accounts receivable, to a corporation
in exchange for all of its capital stock. The exchange qualified
as a tax-free transaction under section 351 of the Internal Rev-
enue Code of 1954.1 Upon receipt of the assets and liabilities of
the proprietorship, the corporation placed on its books a value
for the accounts receivable identical to that disclosed on the
books of the proprietorship prior to the transfer, and also set
up a reserve for bad debts in the same amount as that carried
by the proprietorship.2 The Commissioner increased petitioner's
taxable income for the year of transfer by an amount repre-
senting two separate adjustments: first, the disallowance of a
deduction claimed as an addition to the proprietorship's bad
debt reserve in the year of transfer; and second, the restoration
to income of the remaining balance in the proprietorship's bad
debt reserve. The Tax Court held that the Commissioner was
correct in restoring the bad debt reserve to income since the
proprietorship ceased to exist at the time of the transfer of
assets to the corporation and, therefore, could not incur any
future bad debts. Schuster v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. No. 12, 1968
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. § 50.12.
It has long been held that any balance in a reserve for bad
debts is to be restored to income of the year in which the need
for maintaining the reserve ceases. 3 Initially this doctrine was
applied upon the termination of a business entity through com-
plete liquidation. Subsequently, however, the Internal Revenue
Service developed a policy of restoring reserves to income in
tax-free liquidations concurrent with mergers and reorgani-
zations.4 In Citizens Federal Savings and Loan v. United States,
1. Section 351 provides in part:
No gain or loss shall be recognized if property is transferred to
a corporation by one or more persons solely in exchange for
stock or securities in such corporation and immediately after
the exchange such person or persons are in control ... of the
corporation.
INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 351(a).
2. The reserVe was set up under the authority of section 166 (c)
of the Code, which states:
In lieu of any deduction under subsection (a), there shall be
allowed (in the discretion of the Secretary or his delegate) a
deduction for a reasonable addition to a reserve for bad debts.
3. See, e.g., Geyer, Cornell & Newell, Inc., 6 T.C. 96 (1946);
Peabody Coal Co., 18 B.T.A. 1081 (1930).
4. Citizens Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 290 F.2d 932
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however, the United States Court of Claims, in dictum, noted
the distinction between complete liquidation on the one hand
and liquidation into a parent corporation on the other. The
court stated that in the case of a subsidiary merger "the holder
of the asset continues in existence, although in an altered
form, and continues to experience the risk of bad debt loss."6
This distinction was recognized in CaZavo, Incorporated v. Com-
nissioner,7 where the corporation surviving a merger under sec-
tion 3328 carried all the accounts of the acquired corporation,
including the bad debt reserve which the latter had set up. The
Commissioner had restored to income the entire reserve on the
ground it was no longer necessary after the acquired corporation
was liquidated and dissolved. Before the Tax Court, however,
the Commissioner conceded such reserve was not restored in-
come in the case of a section 332 reorganization. A year later
this distinction between liquidation and a continuing business
was dispositive in Home Savings and Loan Association v. United
StatesY
In a 1962 Revenue Ruling, the Service indicated that the
continuing business distinction would not be applied to a trans-
fer of a sole proprietorship's assets to a corporation controlled
by the transferor in a nontaxable exchange under section 351.10
The Ruling held, instead, that a bad debt reserve was not trans-
ferable to any other entity and, therefore, represented ordinary
income to the taxpayer for the taxable year during which the
transfer of the accounts receivable was made. In support of this
holding, the ruling cited two cases which both dealt with the
liquidation of a corporation.11
Between the time of the Ruling and the instant case only
one decision has considered the problem. In Estate of Heinz
Schmidt v. Commissioner,12 the taxpayer transferred the assets
(Ct. Cl. 1961); Bird Management, Inc., 48 T.C. 586 (1965); J.E. Hawes
Corp., 44 T.C. 705 (1965); Ira Handelman, 36 T.C. 560 (1961); West
Seattle Nat'l Bank, 33 T.C. 341 (1959).
5. 290 F.2d 932 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
6. Id. at 937.
7. 304 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1962).
8. Section 332 provides that no gain or loss is recognized to the
parent corporation when it completely liquidates a subsidiary which it
controls. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 332.
9. 223 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
10. Rev. Rul. 128, 1962-2 Cum. BuLL. 139.
11. The Ruling cited Geyer, Cornell & Newell, Inc., 6 T.C. 96
(1946), and C. Standlee Martin, Inc. v. Riddell, 51 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1376
(S.D. Cal. 1956).
12. 355 F.2d 111 (9th Cir. 1966).
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of his sole proprietorship to a corporation in exchange for an
agreement by the corporation to assume the liabilities of the
business and to issue its capital stock to taxpayer. The exchange
qualified as a tax-free transaction under section 351. In com-
puting the stock's par value, the taxpayer deducted the balance
of the bad debt reserve from the face value of the accounts
receivable. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's assess-
ment of a deficiency in the amount of the reserve on the tax-
payer's return in the year of the exchange, but the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that, although the tax-
payer no longer needed the reserve, he had not in any economic
sense recovered its value.13 The Commissioner had contended
that the taxpayer, by obtaining for the accounts receivable stock
equivalent to their net value, sustained a loss equal to the
amount of the reserve, but that the loss was not recognized by
reason of section 351. The court rejected this contention as cre-
ating fictitious income and concluded that no income is re-
ceived, whether the exchange is for stock or cash, unless the
consideration received exceeds the net amount of the receiv-
ables. 14
The Schmidt rationale was not followed in the instant case.
In upholding the Commissioner, the Tax Court reiterated the
doctrine that a reserve for bad debts must be restored to income
when events make the reserve no longer necessary. While de-
fining a bad debt reserve as "a forecast of possible future bad
debt losses,"'15 the court determined that the taxpayer had ter-
minated the activities of the proprietorship and had disposed of
his assets including his accounts receivable. Therefore, he
would never thereafter sustain any bad debt losses in respect of
the debts thus transferred, and the deduction previously taken
for such anticipated loss must be restored to income. 6
The Schuster court categorized as inconsequential the fact
that the taxpayer may have realized a loss on the transfer of
accounts since such a loss cannot be classified as a bad debt.17
Instead, the loss must be deducted if possible under the applic-
able section of the Code for that type of loss.'8 The deductions
13. Id. at 113.
14. Id. at 114.
15. 50 T.C. No. 12, 1968 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 50.12, at 71.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. At this point the Schuster court was reiterating an argument
often made in prior cases. For instance in Bird Management, Inc., 48 T.C.
586, 597 (1965), the Tax Court stated:
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comprising the bad debt reserve gain their validity from section
166 and are justified only as long as the possibility of incurring
a bad debt exists. It was with this theory that the Schuster
court rejected the holding in Schmidt, since in that decision the
court disposed of the question on the basis of whether the
creditor had received consideration on the disposition sufficient
to cover the reserve. 9 Schuster maintained that this ques-
tion is irrelevant since any loss incurred will not be a bad debt
loss.
The court concluded by noting the fact that its decision did
not preclude the corporation, in the event it suffered the bad
debt losses, from tax benefits either through additions to its own
reserve or through deductions for bad debts when the losses are
actually sustained.20
By rejecting the precedent set in Schmidt and returning to
the approach articulated in Revenue Ruling 62-128, the Tax
Court followed a policy which ignores both the accounting prin-
ciples underlying the reserve method and the purpose of sec-
tion 351.21
The court's characterization of the bad debt reserve as a
"forecast" of future bad debts, while not totally inaccurate, dis-
torts the actual function of the reserve. By referring to the
reserve as anticipating future bad debts, the court laid the basis
for its theory that once the proprietorship terminated, the need
It is not that the creditor has received something or has real-
ized income in the usual sense. Rather, it is an accounting
concept that one who has taken a deduction for bad debts in
earlier years by reason of his method of accounting must, in
accordance with that method of accounting, restore that deduc-
tion to income in a later year when it becomes clear that no bad
debt loss will occur. If a different type of loss should occur,
as a result of sale, that loss would then be deductible to the
extent that and subject to such limitations as the Code prescribes
for such losses.
This argument ignores the fact that a section 351 transfer is by defini-
tion tax-free. The ensuing loss, therefore, will not be recognized by
the taxpayer.
19. 50 T.C. No. 12, 1968 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. f 50.12, at 72.
20. Id. While this statement is merely dictum, it suggests a pos-
sibility that the Schmidt court specifically refused to pass upon. Estate
of Heinz Schmidt v. Commissioner, 355 F.2d 111 (9th Cir. 1966).
Judge Simpson, in his dissent in Schuster, proposes a similar idea
by stating that the reserve should be required to be carried over to the
transferee corporation. 50 T.C. No. 12, 1968 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. f 50.12,
at 73.
21. Most commentators have taken a position opposed to the hold-
ing in the instant case. E.g., Hickman, Incorporation and Capitalization,




for the reserve also ended. However, the reserve is actually a
valuation account which attempts to reflect the actual current
value of the receivables. 22  Under the reserve method, the
bad debt losses are matched against the income attributable to
the accounts for which the reserve is set up. The bad debt
losses are accounted for at the time the credit is given and the
receivables accepted. It is at this time that the loss actually
occurs. Because the accrual method taxpaper is taxed on the
face value of accounts receivable at the time the debt is estab-
lished rather than when it is paid, the function of a bad debt
reserve is to reduce the taxable income on the receivables to a
level consistent with its actual value by deducting that part of
the income which the taxpayer can not reasonably expect to
realize. It is, therefore, irrelevant that the sole proprietorship
no longer "needs" the reserve after the assets are transferred in
a section 351 transaction, since the taxpayer will never receive
income from the accounts receivable even though he has paid
a tax thereon.
Since the actual value of the receivables is the face value
minus the reserve, a transfer of the accounts to the corporation
without a corresponding transfer of the reserve produces an in-
accurate valuation of the accounts on the books of the corpora-
tion. While the corporation is probably allowed to set up its
own reserve after the transfer,23 the deductions it takes will be
against income not representing the transactions from which
the accounts resulted, clearly a departure from the underlying
theory of the accrual method. By not allowing the reserve to
be carried over to the corporation, the Tax Court allocates an
item of income to the proprietorship, but puts the direct expense
of earning that income on the corporation.
The requirement that the reserve be restored to income also
goes against the purpose of section 351 as indicated in the legis-
lative history.24 The basic philosophy of the section is that a
transfer to a controlled corporation is to be treated as a mere
change in the form of ownership with the business being seen
as a single, continuous operation. Therefore, the section specifies
22. See H. FiNEY & R. OLDBERG, LAwYFR's GUIDE TO Accou.Trn a 54
(1955).
23. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
24. H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1921); S. REP. No.
275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1921).
Congress indicated that the section similar to the present section
351 was passed to allow a tax free transfer where the proprietor retains
control since the transfer would not generate any cash receipts out of
which taxes could be paid.
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that the event of incorporation will not precipitate recognized
gain or loss.25 The weakness of the court's argument is apparent
from its choice of cited cases, most of which involved entities
which completely terminated business after the proprietor had
received the full face value of the receivables in exchange for
their transfer to another party.26 Such is not the case in a
section 351 transaction. The enterprise continues to exist but
in a different form. Moreover, no consideration passes to the
proprietor.
It is difficult to understand the Tax Court's position, in view
of the purpose of section 351, and since there is not a problem of
tax avoidance. Section 166 of the Code allows only reasonable
additions to a reserve at the discretion of the Secretary.27 There-
fore, unreasonable or excessive deductions can be disallowed on
an individual basis without upsetting the tax free incorporation
transfers as Schuster clearly does. Moreover, even an excessive
reserve will have to be either offset by worthless debts or re-
stored to income at some future date when it actually becomes
unnecessary.
At the conclusion of Schuster, the Tax Court states that "it
would be inappropriate, in order to reach a seemingly equitable
result, to proceed upon theories that ... do violence to the stat-
ute."28 It is submitted that the decision in the instant case is
where the violence to the statute is effected. It seems clear that
where the policy of a section is apparent, a transaction which
is not specifically dealt with in the Code should be handled by
the Tax Court with the spirit of the section in mind. Such an
approach was not taken in the instant case.
29
Federal Income Taxation: "Right to Income" as
Test for Income in Respect of a Decedent
Decedent, a cash basis taxpayer, entered into an executory
contract to sell the stock of a corporation in which he was the
25. See note 1 supra.
26. Cases cited note 4 supra.
27. See note 2 supra.
28. Shuster v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. No. 12, 1968 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. f 50.12, at 72.
29. Two cases since Schuster, however, have returned to the pre-
cedent set in Schmidt and have refused to restore the reserve to income
in a section 351 exchange. Rowe v. United States, 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
1 9162 (1969); Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank v. United States, 22 Am.
Fed. Tax R.2d 5202 (N.D. Ala. 1968).
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sole stockholder.1 Some of the conditions necessary for the
closing not having been met prior to decedent's death,2 the
transaction was subsequently closed by his executor.3  The
Internal Revenue Service, claiming that the gain from the sale
represented income in respect of a decedent,4 ruled that the
stock's basis could not be stepped-up under section 1014(a).
After paying the disputed taxes, the executor and beneficiaries
applied for a refund, which was denied by the district court,
ruling that the gain represented income in respect of a decedent,
since it was primarily due to the decedent's economic activity.5
The Fifth Circuit affirmed per curiam, holding that although
the "economic activity" of the decedent is not the determinative
test, the gain was income in respect of a decedent since the
decedent had acquired a "right" to the income by signing the
executory contract. Trust Company of Georgia v. Ross, 392 F.2d
694 (5th Cir. 1967).
Section 1014(a) of the Internal Revenue Code allows the
capital gains on investment property to pass to the beneficiaries
of an estate without being subject to the federal income tax.
After the federal estate tax is paid by the executor of the es-
tate, the beneficiaries or personal representatives of the estate
receiving the property are expected to pay income tax only on
the difference between the fair market value at the time of death,
or the alternate valuation date,6 and the proceeds from an
eventual sale.7 However, section 1014(c) specifically makes this
rule inapplicable to income in respect of a decedent under sec-
1. Actually this was part of a larger contract to sell the assets of
a hotel chain in which the decedent was the major stockholder. The
only question in this case has to do with the sale of stock of one of
the corporations in the chain. Trust Co. of Georgia v. Ross, 262 F.
Supp. 900, 901 (N.D. Ga. 1966).
2. Since the stock was in escrow, delivery of title and possession
of the stock and of the papers necessary to effect the sale had not taken
place. 262 F. Supp. at 902, 904. The $2,350,000 loan necessary to close
the sale had not been obtained by the purchaser. 262 F. Supp. at 903-04.
3. The most significant modification the executor made to the
contract dealt with his change from a strictly cash sale to sale based on
cash and a $500,000 loan by the estate. 262 F. Supp. at 904.
4. INT. RE V. CODE of 1954, § 691 [hereinafter referred to by section
number only].
5. Trust Co. of Georgia v. Ross, 262 F. Supp. 900 (N.D. Ga. 1966).
6. Section 2032.
7. See Estate of Burnett v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 897 (1943).
Although some doubt was thrown upon the principles established in
this case by the decision of Commissioner v. Linde, 213 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.
1954), they were later recognized by the Internal Revenue Service. See




Section 691 finds its origin in an amendment to section 42
of the Revenue Act of 1934.9 Prior to 1934, a decedent paid
tax only on that income found on his books at death.10 Thus,
the accrual basis taxpayer was taxed on all income accrued at
the time of his death while the cash basis taxpayer paid taxes
only on income actually received prior thereto. This resulted
in an obvious loss of revenue to the Treasury and an equally
obvious inequity between decedents keeping their books on
different bases. Congress, thus wanting to insure that a de-
ceased cash basis taxpayer would return taxes on all the in-
come that would have "accrued" had he kept his books on the
accrual basis," enacted the 1934 amendment to section 42.12
Most writers assumed that the term "accrued" used in sec-
tion 42 would be interpreted in the ordinary tax accrual con-
text.13 It was so interpreted by the Third Circuit in the case of
Enright v. Commissioner.'4 However, on appeal, the Supreme
Court reversed the Third Circuit and held that "accrued" for
purposes of section 42 did not necessarily have the same mean-
ing as "accrued" in the ordinary tax accrual context. 5 The
Court, going beyond the tax accrual definition, held that cer-
tain partnership assets which would not normally have accrued
to the taxpayer at the time of death were income in respect of
the decedent. The Enright definition of accrual for the pur-
8. Section 1014(c).
9. Act of May 10, 1934, ch. 277, § 42, 48 Stat. 694.
10. For a full discussion of pre-1934 law see 2 J. MERTENS, LAW Or
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 12.100 (1942) [hereinafter cited as MERTENS];
Note, Income in Respect of Decedents: The Scope of Section 126, 65
HARV. L. RE. 1024-25 (1952).
11. See Commissioner v. Linde, 213 F.2d 1, 6-7 (9th Cir. 1954);
Estate of Davidson v. United States, 292 F.2d 937, 941 (Ct. Cl. 1961);
Keck v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 313, 319-20 (1968).
12. . . . In the case of the death of a taxpayer there shall be
included in computing net income for the taxable period in
which falls the date of his death, amounts accrued up to the
date of his death if not otherwise properly includible in respect
of such period or a prior period.
Act of May 10, 1934, ch. 277, § 42, 48 Stat. 694 (emphasis added).
Sections 42 and 43 of the House bill were so drawn as to
require the inclusion in the income tax return for the decedent
of all items of income and deductions accrued up to the date of
death regardless of the fact that the decedent may have kept
his books on a cash basis.
S. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1934). See also H.R. REP. No.
704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1934) (similar language).
13. MERTENS § 12.101.
14. 112 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1940).
15. Helvering v. Enright, 312 U.S. 636 (1941).
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poses of income in respect of a decedent resulted in a burden to
the taxpayer by forcing much more income into the decedent's
last taxable year than would normally have been expected. 16
To avoid this "bunching of income" into the decedent's last re-
turn,17 Congress, in 1942,18 converted section 42 to section 126 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, which allowed the tax to be
paid by the party actually receiving the income-the beneficia-
ries or the estate.19 Congress also dropped the use of the word
"accrued" and inserted the word "right."20  In 1954 section 126
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 became the present section
691,21. with changes irrelevant to the present discussion.22
Unfortunately, while Enright in effect disregarded the orig-
inal Congressional intent of equalizing the income tax con-
sequences of death for accrual basis and cash basis taxpayers,
by applying an accrual test to each, neither Congress nor any
subsequent court has supplied an alternative test to distinguish
between income in respect of a decedent and that property which
should receive a stepped-up basis under section 1014(a). In
searching for a workable distinction, the courts have generally
dealt in terms of the decedent earning the income or his "eco-
nomic activity" contributing to it.23 However, no clear test has
yet evolved and there has been substantial confusion over the
proper test.
This confusion provided the basis for the appellant's argu-
ment in the Ross case. Prior to his death, the decedent entered
into a contract to sell his corporate stock.24 The stock was placed
16. E-TENS § 12.100 (Supp. 1954).
17. See S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1942); H.R. REP.
No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1942).
18. Act of Oct. 21, 1942, ch. 619, § 134, 56 Stat. 830.
19. See S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1942); H.R.
REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1942). See also Estate of O'Daniels
v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 966, 968 (2d Cir. 1949); Trust Co. of Georgia
v. Ross, 262 F. Supp. 900, 907 (N.D. Ga. 1966).
20. See Act of Oct. 21, 1942, ch. 619, § 134, 56 Stat. 830.
21. Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, § 691, 68A Stat. 235.
22. The major concern when section 126 became section 691 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 had to do with inequities which arose
in the event of successive deaths of decedents and with the inclusion
of installment payments as part of income in respect of a decedent.
S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 373-76 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. A218-A220 (1954). The lower court in Ross ac-
cepted, for purposes of discussing this case, that the differences between
126 and 691 were immaterial. 262 F. Supp. at 907. This analysis was
accepted by the Fifth Circuit. 392 F.2d at 695.
23. E.g., Levin v. United States, 373 F.2d 434 (1st Cir. 1967); United
States v. Ellis, 264 F.2d 325 (2d Cir. 1959).
24. 262 F. Supp. at 901-03.
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in escrow with the understanding that it would be returned to
the decedent in the event that either the corporate premises
were destroyed prior to the date set for closing or the purchaser
could not raise the purchase money.25 In the latter instance,
the earnest money paid was to serve as liquidated damages.
26
At the time of decedent's death, neither title27 nor possession
28
had passed to the purchaser, the papers necessary to effect such
a passage having not been delivered. 29 Indeed, there was serious
question whether the purchaser could raise the necessary funds
for closing. 30 In light of these circumstances, the executor and
beneficiaries argued that, at the time of decedent's death, he did
not have an unqualified right and was not "entitled" to the
purchase price.31 They reasoned that since that status of the
transaction was uncertain at the time of death, any gain sub-
sequently realized should not be considered part of the dece-
dent's income. Rather, the stock should pass to the estate with
a stepped-up basis under section 1014(a), thereby avoiding all
federal income tax.
3 2
In rejecting this argument, the Fifth Circuit specifically
25. Id. at 902.
26. Id.
27. When property is placed in escrow, title will pass according
to the intention of the parties. E.g., Chaplin v. Commissioner, 136 F.2d
298 (9th Cir. 1943). In the instant case, clearly the decedent did not
intend to pass title until and unless the purchaser could raise the
money necessary to close the deal.
Also, as a general rule, until the performance of the condition
upon which delivery in escrow is made, legal title remains in the
grantor. E.g., Suratt v. Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia, 43 F.2d 467, 471
(4th Cir. 1930). This general rule has been applied to stock certifi-
cates. E.g., Chaplin v. Commissioner, 136 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1943).
28. The possession of the stock remained in the hands of the es-
crow agent until the date set for closing. 262 F. Supp. at 901-04 (by
implication). The possession of the corporate premises remained in
the hands of the decedent and his representatives up until the date set
for closing. Brief for Appellant at 6 (never disputed in either the
record, briefs of appellee or court opinions).
29. There was no reason to deliver the final papers which would
effect the transfer until the closing date, which was after the decedent's
death.
30. On the date of the decedent's death, the purchaser had not
heard from the company from which it planned to borrow the money.
Brief for Appellant at 7; Record at 119-20. The purchaser then ap-
proached the Trust Company of Georgia on the possibility of financing
the loan. Finally, after some dispute and after getting the executor of
the estate to agree to have the estate of the decedent participate in the
loan to the extent of $500,000, the purchaser raised the money. 262
F. Supp. at 903-04.




discarded the "economic activity" test in favor of its own "en-
titlement" or "right to income" test. The opinion makes quite
clear that unless the decedent's economic activity in some way
evokes a "right" to the proceeds of a sale, the gain cannot be
taxed as income in respect of a decedent under section 691. 33 On
the surface the court seems to have adopted an accrual account-
ing test consistent with the pre-Enright legislative history.
"Right to income," or more specifically, the right to receive in-
come, is the determinative factor in whether an item properly
accrues for normal income tax purposes.34 Thus, the court seems
to be treating a cash basis taxpayer in accrual terms-"right to
income."
Closer analysis, however, reveals that the Fifth Circuit's
definition of "right" is quite different from that commonly un-
derstood by tax lawyers and courts in returning income of
accrual basis taxpayers. Although the "right" which produces
the income must be present at death,35 a reasonable certainty
that the "right" will in fact produce income does not seem to be
required. The test is more hindsighted, the "right" being judged
in light of the actual future events. If a decedent acquires any
"right" to income before his death, and the right results in a
realized gain, the same will be taxed as income in respect of a
decedent. The fact that the right is contingent or not sub-
stantial seems immaterial. Indeed, there is authority to suggest
that the right does not have to be legally enforceable.36 Under
Ross, a vote by the shareholders and the board of directors of a
corporation to sell its assets may well be sufficient to give stock-
olders a "right" to the later liquidation proceeds after his
death, so as to render any gain income in respect of a decedent
under section 691.37
33. 392 F.2d at 695.
34. E.g., Guarantee Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 303 U.S. 493 (1938);
Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182 (1934). See
also 2 MERTENS § 12.60; Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1 (1957).
35. 392 F.2d at 696.
36. E.g., Estate of Bausch v. Commissioner, 186 F.2d 313 (2d Cir.
1951); Estate of O'Daniels v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1949).
37. Keck v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 313 (1968). This case was de-
cided using the lower court's test in Ross as its basis. The decedent, a
minority stockholder in a corporation, died shortly after the corporation
had entered into an executory contract to sell its assets. At the time of
the decedent's death, the necessary ICC approval of the sale and certain
revenue rulings had not been obtained. After they were obtained 18
months later, the sale of the assets was made in accordance with the
original contract. The stockholders then voted to liquidate the corpora-
tion and take the liquidation proceeds. A divided court decided that the
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In standard tax accrual cases, an item properly accrues when
all of the events which fix the right occur.38  The accrual basis
taxpayer is under no obligation to pay taxes on income which
is contingent and might never be received.3 9 There are no hard
and fast rules for determining when a right becomes fixed or
unconditional, and each transaction is decided on its own
facts.40  However, it seems that there is no accrual when the
purchaser has yet to receive a loan necessary to close even
though the loan is almost assured.41 Indeed, there is author-
ity that a "right" to income has not accrued when, under an
executory contract, the seller has not tendered the papers neces-
sary to effect the transfer, has not passed either title or posses-
sion, or has not demanded the purchase price.42 Therefore, if
"right" had been used in the standard tax accrual context, the
gain from the liquidation proceeds was income in respect of a decedent
under § 691. The dissent stressed the fact that at the time of death the
decedent was not entitled to the income. The most that could be said
is that the corporation had a contingent right to any gain realized from
the sale, but that the decedent had no right to the liquidation proceeds.
At the time of his death, no formal action had been taken toward
liquidation of the corporation and none of the stockholders, including
the decedent, was committed to voting for liquidation. Nevertheless,
the majority felt that there was enough of an informal understanding
that the corporation would be liquidated once the sale was complete that
the liquidation proceeds should be considered part of the decedent's
income.
Although the majority decision was reached on the basis of the
"economic activity" test employed by the lower court in Ross, the same
result could have been reached using the Fifth Circuit's interpretation
of the "right" test. This would be done by saying that the vote by the
shareholders to sell the corporation's assets was tantamount to a vote
to liquidate the corporation. Since in substance, if not in form, the
liquidation had been decided prior to the stockholder's death, his "right"
to the liquidation proceeds had vested.
However, this case contains greater contingencies than were found
in Ross, which could justify another court reaching a different result
under the "right" test. At the time of the decedent's death in Keck,
any right he had was, at best, very contingent in light of the lack of ICC
approval of the sale and very informal in light of the lack of any formal
action to liquidate. Also one should remember that Keck was a minor-
ity stockholder who could have done nothing if the majority stock-
holder had, for reasons of his own, decided not to liquidate.
38. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1 (1957). See also Spring City Foundry
Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182 (1934); United States v. Anderson,
269 U.S. 422 (1926).
39. E.g., North Amer. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417 (1936).
40. Chaplin v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 140 (8th Cir. 1950); Com-
missioner v. Segall, 114 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1940).
41. Chaplin v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 140 (8th Cir. 1950). Here
it was clear that there was greater surety of getting the necessary loan
than in Ross.
42. Lucas v. North Texas Lumber Co., 281 U.S. 11 (1930).
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gain from the sale of the stock in Ross would not have accrued
to the decedent at the time of his death as his right to the in-
come was never fixed or unconditional. Under neither gen-
erally accepted accounting principles, 43 nor under standard in-
come tax accrual concepts, would the income from the sale have
accrued to the decedent at the time of his death. Whatever
the test delineated in Ross is, it is not one of accrual as applied
to the facts at bar.
If the Ross application of the "right" test is upheld, a dual
definition of the word "right" will exist-the traditional mean-
ing, judicially defined in the accrual taxpayer context, and the
Ross definition. The result will be the continuation of a con-
fusing and uncertain test for distinguishing between income in
respect of a decedent and property which should receive a
stepped-up basis under 1014 (a).
The practical justification for this dual definition is prob-
ably to prevent certain property from receiving a stepped-up
basis under 1014(a). Accepting the stepped-up basis provisions,
there is presently no means other than an accrual test to dis-
tinguish between 1014(a) property and income in respect of a
decedent. The Ross "right," like the Enright "accrual," is in-
capable of being defined by either Congress or the courts. In
the final analysis, the Ross court's dual definition of the word
"right" continues the confusion, failing to delineate what the
test is and stating only what it is not. It would seem prefer-
able to use the word "right" as it has been judicially defined in
the accrual taxpayer context, thereby filling the hiatus in the
present law and providing a much needed test for distinguish-
ing between income in respect of a decedent under 691 and
that property which should receive a stepped-up basis under 1014
(a). Such a test would have the dual advantage of certainty
and administrative workability.44
43. P. GRADY, INVENTORY OF GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING
PRINCIPLES FOR BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 36 (1965).
44. If the Ross application of the "right" test is accepted, another
possible problem deals with the effect of a rescission and/or renegotia-
tion of the executory contract after the decedent's death. An essential
element of the Ross test is that the "right," even though contingent,
must be present at the time of death. 392 F.2d at 696. Elementary
contract law allows parties to a contract to rescind the instrument vol-
untarily, thereby destroying all the "rights" created by it. 5 A. CORBIN,
CoRIN ON CONTRACTS § 1236 (1964). Such a rescission would seem to
take a transaction outside the scope of the Ross test. The "right,"
present at deatl would be destroyed and thus incapable of producing
income.
Although a contract rescission may well avoid the Ross result, the
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Federal Procedure: Broadening of
Taxpayer's Standing to Sue
The plaintiffs brought suit to enjoin the expenditures of fed-
eral funds by private schools under titles I and II of the Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.1 They claimed
standing to sue solely on the ground that they were federal tax-
payers. The Government moved to dismiss for lack of standing.
A three-judge district court ruled in favor of the Government.2
An appeal on the limited question of standing was taken di-
rectly to the Supreme Court,3 which held that under the circum-
stances of the case, and based on the application of a new test for
determining the standing of federal taxpayers in federal courts,
the plaintiffs should be permitted to maintain the action. Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) .4
The judicial power of the United States is limited by article
I of the Constitution to specific kinds of cases or controversies.
problem becomes much more complex when there is a subsequent re-
negotiation of the contract. See Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361(1960) (transaction entered into only for the purpose of tax avoidance
is considered a step transaction and will have no effect as far as avoid-
ing income tax). In Ross the appellant argued that the modification
of the contract by the executor resulted in a new contract quite differeit
from that entered into by the decedent. Brief for Appellant at 30. The
fact that the court did not even comment on the argument would seem
to indicate that the court did not accept the reasoning and that to de-
stroy a "right" to income there must be more than a substantial
modification of contract. Indeed, since the Ross test uses hindsight in
which the right does not have to be substantial, one could speculate that
the courts may not consider a "right" to income effectively destroyed,
even where there is a legitimate rescission and renegotiation of the con-
tract for substantial non-tax reasons.
1. 79 Stat. 27 (1965); 80 Stat. 1199 (1965).
2. Flast v. Gardner, 271 F. Supp. 1, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (Frankel,
J., dissenting).
3. The appeal was taken under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1964).
4. Flast v. Cohen has been commented upon in the following:
Davis, Standing: Taxpayers & Others, 35 U. CHI. L. Rzv. 601 (1968);
Comment, 35 BROoK. L. REv. 94 (1968); Comment, 3 SUFF. L. REV. 185
(1968); Comment, 21 VAmN. L. REv. 850 (1968).
5. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority;-to all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Counsuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and mari-
time Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States
shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;
-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citi-
zens of different States,-between Citizens of the same State
claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a
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In terms of general requirements, the courts have established
that for a case or controversy to be justiciable it must be sus-
ceptible of resolution through the judicial process,6 it must pre-
sent a genuine confrontation of adverse interests,7 and it must
contain the element of adverse consequence, or, otherwise stated,
potential injury to the party bringing the action.8 Standing to
sue is another important requirement of the doctrine of case or
controversy.9 By requiring that the party seeking relief have a
stake in the outcome of the litigation, it ensures the presence
of adverse consequence.' 0 It is addressed to the question of
whether the particular plaintiff is the proper party to seek
judicial intervention."
The question of standing to sue has most frequently arisen
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.
U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
6. The words "case" and "controversy" act to "... limit the
business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary con-
text and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through
the judicial process." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
7. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937); Chicago
& G.T. Ry. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339 (1892).
8. A court will act only where the litigation grows "... out of a
controversy affecting legal or equitable rights as to a person or prop-
erty. All questions of law arising in such cases are judicially deter-
minable." Marye v. Parsons, 114 U.S. 325, 330 (1884). More recently
the Court held that "[tjhe power of . . .this Court, to pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of Congress arises only when the interests of
litigants require the use of this judicial authority for their protection
against actual interference. A hypothetical threat is not enough."
United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-90 (1947). Viewed
together these requirements reflect a determination that the Court's
power to declare the law extends only to particular cases; there is, for
example, no power merely to declare acts of Congress void. Chicago &
G.T. Ry. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892); Marye v. Parsons, supra.
A justiciable case or controversy is not presented when the Court
is faced with a moot question; the mootness puts the conflict beyond
the power of the judiciary. California v. San Pablo & T. R.R., 149 U.S.
308 (1892). Similarly, there is no case or controversy when the action is
collusive, Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 251 (1850); when it seeks an
advisory opinion, United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146 (1960); or when
it presents political questions. Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262
U.S. 51 (1923); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
9. Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943); Frothingham v. Mellon,
262 U.S. 447 (1923).
10. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962), where the Court
stated that adverse consequence is necessary to the proper resolution
of legal questions.
11. ".... [W]hen standing is placed in issue in a case, the question
is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party
to request an adjudication of a particular issue . F." last v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968).
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in cases involving attempts by federal taxpayers to challenge
the validity of governmental action. In Frothingham v. Mel-
lon,' 2 the first case dealing directly with the standing of tax-
payers in federal courts, the plaintiff asserted his standing as a
taxpayer to challenge the constitutionality of the Maternity Act
of 1921.13 Plaintiff alleged that in enacting the statute, Con-
gress had attempted to exercise powers not granted to it by the
Constitution.1 4 It was claimed that the statute resulted in the
taking of property, in the guise of taxes, without due process of
law.15 In holding that the plaintiff-taxpayer lacked standing,
the Court relied on three arguments: (1) that the relationship
between the federal taxpayer and the federal government is
very different from the relationship between the taxpayer and
his municipal or state government whose actions taxpayers may
challenge; 16 (2) that entertainment of the present suit would re-
sult in a multitude of actions by disgruntled taxpayers testing
almost every legislative appropriation; 1'7 and (3) that the inherent
power of the Court to review and annul acts of Congress on the
ground that they are unconstitutional is limited.'8 By holding
that the harm suffered by a taxpayer is not the type of direct
injury required by the "case or controversy" doctrine,' 9 the
Court effectively removed the spending power of Congress from
the scope of judicial review.
The Frothingham case presented two distinct issues. The
first was whether lack of standing represents a constitutional
bar to judicial intervention, or whether the concept is merely a
rule of judicial convenience. 20  The second was whether stand-
ing is a separate question to be decided in isolation from an
inquiry into the merits of the case, or whether it is inextricably
12. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
13. Act of Nov. 23, 1921, ch. 135, 42 Stat. 224.
14. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 479 (1923).
15. Id. at 486.
16. The Court considered the federal taxpayer's interest in Treas-
ury funds as relatively insignificant and minute in comparison to his
interest in state or municipal moneys. Id. at 486-88.
17. Id. at 487.
18. The Court stated that annulment is proper only when the
party asserting the claim can show actual or imminent injury from
application of the act and not merely that he suffers in common with
his fellow taxpayers. Id. at 488-89.
19. See note 8 supra.
20. Addressing itself to this issue, the Court in Frothingham
stated that for the Court to act in a situation where the party seeking
relief did not have standing would result in a violation of the Constitu-
tion as being beyond the scope of judicial power and an invasion of
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bound up with and not severable from the merits.21
The general reasons for denying an individual standing
when the action is based solely on his status as a federal tax-
payer are no longer persuasive.22 Moreover, the particular rea-
sons relied on by the Court in Frothingham are unrealistic in
the context of our present tax system.23 The position taken by
the state courts with respect to taxpayer suits is almost uniformly
opposed to the approach taken by Frothingham.24  The Court
had previously upheld the right of federal taxpayers to bring
suit asserting only that status.25  This might suggest that no-
thing in the Constitution demands that litigants asserting only
their status as taxpayers be denied standing. Furthermore, to
the extent that a taxpayer is denied standing to challenge Gov-
ernment action which adversely affects him, fundamental prin-
ciples of justice are violated.26
The Court in the instant case held that subject to certain
limitations, plaintiffs asserting nothing more than their status
as taxpayers now have standing to challenge federal spending.
It reasoned that nothing in article III absolutely bars such
suits, 27 and that the basic premise of Frothingham--that a single
federal taxpayer does not have a substantial interest in the
expenditure of funds by the Government-should be rejected
as unwarranted. The Court concluded that a taxpayer could be
the powers of other branches of Government. 262 U.S. 447, 488-89
(1923). There is, however, substantial authority supporting the posi-
tion that the doctrine of standing is nothing more than a rule of judicial
convenience. Davis, Standing to Challenge Governmental Action, 39
MnN. L. REv. 353, 427 (1955); Lewis, Constitutional Rights and the Mis-
use of Standing, 14 STAN. L. REv. 433, 453 (1962).
21. Some justices feel that the question of standing is to be treated
as a threshhold inquiry. E.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1950) (concurring opinion). It is argued
that before the Court can act in a substantive manner, there must be a
case or controversy. The presence or absence of this element is an in-
quiry distinct from the substantive issues which the plaintiff is seeking
to raise. Id. The opposite view is that constitutional rights and the con-
cept of standing are inseparable. Id. at 198.
22. Davis, supra note 20.
23. Id. at 386.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 386-87.
26. Id. at 355. To a certain degree, the Flast Court shares these
views. It states that there is no absolute bar in Article III to suits by
federal taxpayers challenging allegedly unconstitutional federal tax-
ing and spending programs. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968).
Also, after noting that commentators have criticized Frothingham as
outdated, the Court states that the very existence of the controversy
suggests that a new inquiry ought to be made. Id. at 94.
27. Id. at 101.
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sufficiently affected by an unconstitutional expenditure of funds
to require that he be given the right to enjoin the expenditure.2
The Court then proceeded to develop a test for determining
when a taxpayer's economic interest in the outcome of a case is
sufficient for standing to be conferred.29 The Court stated that
the necessary stake may be found when there is a logical link
between the status which the plaintiff asserts, and the claim he
seeks to adjudicate.30 In order to establish the link, two show-
ings must be made: (1) that there is a connection between
the asserted taxpaying status and the type of legislative action
contested; 31 and (2) that the challenged congressional action
directly contravenes some specific constitutional limitation on the
taxing and spending power.3 2 It was stated that when both
nexuses are established, the party challenging the Government
action will have shown the requisite personal stake in the out-
come, and standing will be conferred.3 3 The Court then con-
cluded that the appellants had satisfied the requirements of the
test.3 4 It also noted that Frothingham was consistent with the
stated test. The plaintiffs in that case had not satisfied the
second aspect of the test since they had not alleged that the
legislative enactment exceeded specific constitutional limits.3 5
In Flast the Court acted to secure review of Government
action which had previously been beyond the scope of judicial
supervision. In doing so, however, the Court may have relied
upon a false assumption regarding the nature of the taxpayer
suit. The Court viewed such actions as mere attempts to vindi-
cate individual pecuniary wrongs.3 6 But it seems clear that this
is not the sole function of taxpayer suits. It would be more
accurate to view the plaintiffs in such actions not merely as
individuals seeking redress of private grievances but as "private
attorneys-general."3 7  In one sense, their claims lack any per-
28. Id. at 104 n.25.
29. Id. at 101.
30. Id. at 102.
31. Id. This means that litigants asserting their status as federal
taxpayers may not challenge the constitutionality of exercises of con-
gressional power which are essentially regulatory in nature. Id.
32. Id. at 102-03. A contention that Congress has exceeded its
general powers under the taxing and spending clause is not sufficient
to confer standing. Id. at 103.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 104.
35. Id. at 104-05.
36. This follows from the Court's discussion "whether the party
invoking federal court jurisdiction has 'a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy'. . . ." Id. at 101.
37. Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943).
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sonal interest, but are shared equally with a vast number of
fellow taxpaying citizens. 38  In effect, these plaintiffs sue as
taxpayers representing all taxpayers. 9 Such actions to vindicate
public rights have long been considered judicially cognizable as
within the scope of the requirements of the "case or controversy"
doctrine.40
Since the Court did not view the instant action in the broad
manner suggested above, it did not attempt to prescribe general
rules for determining when actions to vindicate public rights
should be entertained. Its narrower view led it to adopt a test
which will confer standing only when the circumstances of the
particular case show that the taxpayer has a personal stake in the
outcome of the litigation.41 But the circumstances giving rise
to the personal stake of the plaintiff will not always be the
same as those evidencing the public interest which the plaintiff
attempts to assert. Consequently, the restrictive test employed
by the Court in Flast will result in the denial of judicial relief
to a litigant who, as an individual litigant, lacks the requisite
personal stake in the outcome of the litigation, but attempts to
assert the collective rights of the public at large.
Even apart from its arguably unrealistic approach to tax-
payer suits, the test formulated to determine when a federal
taxpayer will be deemed to have the personal stake necessary to
confer standing seems of dubious merit. The first aspect of the
Court's test-the requirement of a link between the status as-
serted and the type of legislative action contested-seems reason-
able in light of the general standing requirements.42  In addi-
38. There is no allegation that the contested expenditure will af-
fect the plaintiff's own tax liability. Any relief is not in the form of
reductions of personal tax liability but ". . . consists entirely of the
vindication of rights held in common by all citizens." 392 U.S. at 118
(dissenting opinion).
"Whatever the tax impact, it does not distinguish the plaintiff from
the whole body of taxpayers." Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Re-
view: Public Actions, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1265, 1294 (1961).
39. ". . . [T]he impact of the allegedly illegal expenditure on the
plaintiff's own tax liability [is] irrelevant. [The taxpayer sues] not
because of a particular wrong done to him but quite literally qua tax-
payer, a characteristic which he shares with an indeterminate number of
his fellows .... [T]he amount of the tax is irrelevant." Jaffe, supra
note 38, at 1294.
40. See Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942); FCC v.
Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 (1940); Reade v. Ewing,
205 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1953); Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d
Cir. 1943).
41. 392 U.S. at 101.
42. See notes 8-10 supra. Davis takes a similar position. He states,
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tion, it does not seem to pose insurmountable barriers to tax-
payer suits since it does not take any conceptual gymnastics to
see that unconstitutional expenditures of tax funds are injurious
to individual taxpayers. To this extent, the stake of the tax-
payer and the link between his status and claim are coextensive.
The second aspect of the Court's test-the requirement that the
congressional action challenged be shown to contravene directly
some specific constitutional limitation imposed on the taxing and
spending powers-appears ill-founded. If the test as a whole is
designed to confer standing whenever the claimant possesses
the requisite personal stake and interest that imparts an ad-
versary nature to the proceedings, this second requirement will
defeat that purpose.
One reason why this aspect of the Court's test is unwarranted
is that it seems to ignore that ours is a Government which re-
serves to states the powers not conferred upon the federal gov-
ernment.43 Implicit in this concept is the rule that action by the
federal government which does not derive from an enumerated
power is unconstitutional.44 Such actions are subject to judicial
review when challenged by proper parties. Thus, exercises of
Government power which are not sanctioned by the Constitution
are just as unconstitutional as acts which directly contravene
particular provisions of the Constitution.45  Yet, in taxpayer
suits, standing will only be conferred when the plaintiff shows
that the Government action exceeds some particular consti-
tutional provision, and not when he shows that it is generally
beyond the powers delegated to Congress. 46 There is no reason-
.[T] he American way of using courts to enforce constitutional
and statutory limitations... is as appropriate when the statute
under which the officers act has been enacted pursuant to the
congressional power to tax and spend as it is when the statute
has been enacted pursuant to some other congressional power.
Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Cm. L. REV. 601, 636 (1968)
(emphasis in original).
43. U.S. CONST. amend. X. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 81 (1907)
states: "By reason of the fact that there is no general grant of legislative
power it has become an accepted constitutional rule that this is a gov-
ernment of enumerated powers."
"The Government, then, of the United States can claim no powers
which are not granted to it by the constitution, and the powers ac-
tually granted, must be such as are expressly given, or given by neces-
sary implication." Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304,
326 (1816). See also United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635 (1882).
44. See note 43 supra. ". . . [I]f no such power has been granted,
none can be exercised." Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 92 (1907).
45. Id.
46. 392 U.S. at 102-03. The taxpayer must show that the chal-
lenged enactment exceeds some specific constitutional limitation, .... not
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able basis for this distinction. Its result is that a taxpayer may
be turned away for lack of standing even though his claim re-
flects the requisite stake in the outcome.
Another reason why the second aspect of the Court's test
is unwarranted is that it requires a more difficult showing by
taxpayers seeking to challenge allegedly unconstitutional Gov-
ernment action than is required of individuals asserting a differ-
ent status.47 The latter need not refer to a specific constitutional
limitation; 48 it is sufficient to allege merely that the action ex-
ceeds the powers granted by the Constitution.
It seems likely that the restrictive nature of the Flast test
will deter taxpayers from seeking judicial relief. In a system
which guarantees "equal protection under the law," the taxpayer
must seek relief against alleged unconstitutional Government ac-
tion handicapped by conditions not imposed on litigants assert-
ing a different status. The problems raised by the Court's de-
cision are easy to solve. One solution, suggested by Justice
Douglas, 49 would be simply to overrule Frothingham and allow
taxpayer suits on the same basis as they are allowed at the statd
and local level.50 If the Court fears that this approach would
open the floodgates and turn the courts into forums in which tax-
payers could "air their generalized grievances" about the con-
duct of the Government, it could merely eliminate the second
aspect of its test for standing.
It is no answer to this call for liberalization of the Court's
standing requirements to say that it would force the Court into
facing difficult issues with respect to what actions are beyond
the powers delegated to Congress under the taxing and spending
clause. Since the Court attempts to solve spending problems
in other contexts there is no reason why it should refuse to
solve them when they are raised by taxpayers. Thus, it is clear
simply that the enactment is generally beyond the powers delegated to
Congress ... ." Id. at 102-03.
47. A litigant not asserting the status of taxpayer may secure
standing by the mere allegation that an act of Congress generally ex-
ceeds the powers delegated to it. See cases cited note 40 supra.
48. E.g., Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939);
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); Kansas v. Colorado,
206 U.S. 46 (1907); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304(1816).
49. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (concurring opinion).
50. At least 34 states permit taxpayer challenges to state legislation
and almost all jurisdictions allow taxpayers to challenge local actions.




that 45 years after Frothingham, Flast is not the place to stop.
Hopefully, it is but a short pause in a continuum which will
ultimately put the taxpayer on an equal footing with other liti-
gants.
Torts: Accountant Liable to Third Party
for Negligent Misrepresentation
Before making a loan to a Rhode Island corporation, plain-
tiff, a banking corporation and factor, requested the corporate
borrower to furnish certified financial statements. Defendant,
a certified public accountant, prepared statements which repre-
sented the corporation as solvent. Plaintiff, relying on the
statements, lent the corporation considerable funds, most of
which proved unrecoverable due to the corporation's subsequent
failure. Challenging plaintiff's claim of fraudulent or negligent
misrepresentation in the financial statements, defendant moved
to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (b) (6)
on the grounds that (1) the action was barred by the Rhode
Island statute of limitations,1 and (2) lack of privity between
the parties. After dismissing the statute of limitations claim,2
the Rhode Island Federal District Court held, inter alia, that an
accountant is liable for loss occasioned by negligent financial
misrepresentation, relied upon by actually foreseen and limited
classes of persons, regardless of the absence of privity between
the litigants. Rusch Factors Incorporated v. Levin, 284 F. Supp.
85 (D.R.I. 1968).
Privity as a condition to recovery in tort has troubled
the courts ever since the famous Winterbottom v. Wright3 de-
1. R.I. GzN. LAws ANt. § 9-1-14 (1956) applies a one-year
limitation to actions for words spoken and a two-year limitation for
injury to the person.
2. The court felt that the pecuniary loss caused by fraudulent or
negligent misrepresentation was neither personal injury nor injury by
spoken word within the meaning of R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-1-14
(1956). Thus, the six-year catch-all limitation of § 9-1-13 was held to ap-
ply. Because of the relative unimportance of this issue compared to the
substantive question raised by the second defense it will not hereafter
be discussed. Similarly, the court's discussion of choice of law between
New York and Rhode Island, 284 F. Supp. at 88-90, will not be discussed.
3. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). In Winterbottom the defendant
contracted to supply properly maintained coaches to the Postmaster-
General. Plaintiff's employer was also under contract with the Post-
master-General to supply drivers for the coaches, and while in such
service plaintiff was injured by a defective coach. A unanimous court
held for the defendant. Lord Abinger emphasized that the ability to
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cision recognized the restriction. Spurred by Justice Cardozo's
opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company,4 the trend
over the last 30 years has been to relax the requirement of
privity in tort cases, at least where physical injuries are in-
volved.5 Such relaxation, however, has not extended to cases
where third party plaintiffs have suffered pecuniary losses.,
The reason for the difference in treatment between the two
types of cases is not obscure. While the monetary liability for
physical injury can be large, the number of potential parties that
can be physically injured is generally quite limited. Further-
more, the personal injuries which result are usually readily
foreseeable. Third party financial losses, on the other hand,
generally result from reliance on fraudulent or negligent spoken
or written representations.7 Thus, liability could potentially
extend to all who heard or read the representations.8 For in-
stance, a negligently prepared financial statement relayed to
prospective investors could conceivably injure thousands. Pri-
marily because of this potential imposition of large and un-
predictable liability, the courts have been quite reluctant to
fully relax the privity requirement in this area.9
sue on such contracts must be confined to the parties who entered into
them for "It]here is no privity of contract between these parties; and
if the plaintiff can sue, every passenger, or even any person passing
along the road, who was injured by the upsetting of the coach, might
bring a similar action." Id. at 405.
4. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
5. See also Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d
69 (1960); Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MNm. L. REV. 791 (1966).
6. See, e.g., National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1880);
O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 758
(1937); Bilich v. Barnett, 103 Cal. App. 2d 921, 229 P.2d 492 (Cal. Super.
1951); Landell v. Lybrand, 264 Pa. 406, 107 A. 783 (1919).
7. Fraudulent misrepresentations generally result in broader lia-
bility than negligent misrepresentations. The leading English case of
Derry v. Peek, [1889] 14 A.C. 337, established the action of deceit based
upon knowingly false statements or statements made with a reckless
disregard for their truth or falsity. As illustrated by Ultramares Corp.
v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931), discussed infra in text ac-
companying notes 12-15, an action for fraudulent misrepresentation will
often be upheld where a negligent misrepresentation claim would be
rejected.
8. See Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd., [1964]
A.C. 465, 482-83 (Lord Reid); Levitin, Accountants' Scope of Liabilityfor Defective Financial Reports, 15 HAsTGs L.J. 436, 446 (1964).
9. The limitations and reasons advanced have often been criti-
cized. See, e.g., Goodhart, Liability for Innocent but Negligent Misrep-
resentation, 74 YALE L.J. 286, 298 (1964); Meek, Liability of the Ac-
countant to Parties Other Than His Employer for Negligent Misrepre-
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Two other Cardozo opinions are the principal authorities for
imposing liability for negligent misrepresentations to parties not
in privity. In Glanzer v. Shepard,10 a public weigher under con-
tract with a seller of beans negligently weighed and certified
bags of beans. The actual weight was considerably less than
certified and the purchaser of the beans sued the weigher for
the over-payment. In holding the defendant liable for his negli-
gence, Cardozo reasoned that the defendant owed a duty of care
to the purchaser since the defendant knew that reliance on
its certification by the purchaser was the "end and aim of the
transaction." As a result of the nature of the transaction and
plaintiff's reliance on defendant's assertion of skill and care,
Cardozo viewed the parties' relationship as nearly contractual.,.
Nine years later in the famous Ultramares Corporation v.
Touche decision, 2 Cardozo attempted to clarify his extension of
liability to third parties. Defendant, a firm of public account-
ants, was employed by a company to prepare and certify a bal-
ance sheet to be used by the company to obtain extensive credit.
Knowing they would be exhibited to numerous financial in-
stitutions, defendant supplied 32 copies of a certified balance
sheet. Plaintiff relied on the balance sheet and lent funds to
the company, which was declared bankrupt shortly thereafter.
After reviewing the evidence and finding it sufficient to support
the conclusion that the accountants had been negligent, Cardozo
refused to hold that plaintiff was owed a duty of care. He
stated that the balance sheets, unlike the weight certificate in
Glanzer, were not designated for any particular party known to
the defendant, but for a potentially larger unascertained class.'3
sentation, 1942 Wis. L. REv. 371, 388, quoting New York Title & Mortgage
Co. v. Hutton, 71 F.2d 989, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1934) (dissent):
There would seem to be no logical distinction between physical
injury and damage to purely economic interests. Nor is there
any sound reason for denying liability for the use of negligent
words .... It has been said that the reckless writer should be
held to as high a standard as the reckless driver, "for his pen
may impoverish thousands, while his car can hurt but a few."
10. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
11. Id. at 239, 135 N.E. at 275-76.
12. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
13. Id. at 182-83, 174 N.E. at 445-46:
[In Glanzer] the bond was so close as to approach that of
privity, if not completely one with it. Not so in the case at
hand. No one would be likely to urge that there was a con-
tractual relation, or even one approaching it, at the root of any
duty that was owing from the defendants now before us to the
indeterminate class of persons who, presently or in the future,
might deal with the... company in reliance on the audit.
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The purpose of, and anticipated reliance on, the weight certifi-
cate was known to the defendant in Glanzer. Furthermore, in
Ultramares the defendant was only aware of the general pur-
pose of the balance sheets whereas in Glanzer it knew the
particular parties and their degree of reliance on the infor-
mation supplied.14 Thus, Cardozo translated into a rule of
law his concern with subjecting accountants to broad liability
for their negligent misrepresentations. 15
Since Glanzer and Ultramares many courts have failed to
develop the scope of duty theory formulated by Cardozo and
have often clouded the relatively clear limitation he established.
Much of the difficulty is the result of misinterpretations of
Cardozo's alternative holding in Ultramares that "negligence
or blindness, even when not equivalent to fraud, is none the
less evidence to sustain an inference of fraud."'16 On the facts
presented in Ultramares, Cardozo felt that on remand a jury
might find such an inference of fraud.'7 Several decisions fol-
lowed this fraud alternative after misinterpreting Ultramares
as a rejection of liability for straight negligence without priv-
ity.'8 One such decision was State Street Trust Company v.
14. Many writers have criticized the distinction as artificial, sug-
gesting that the defendants in Ultramares were as aware as the defendant
in Glanzer that their information would be relied upon by third parties,
as well as by the contractual client. See, e.g., Levitin, supra note 8, at
445; Meek, supra note 9, at 382; Comment, 9 B.C. IwD. & Com. L. REv. 137,
144-45 (1967).
15. One of Cardozo's most frequently quoted phrases expresses his
fears of imposing extensive liability on accountants:
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder,
the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of de-
ceptive entries, may expose accountants to a liability in an in-
determinate amount for an indeterminate time to an inde-
terminate class.
255 N.Y. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
16. Id. at 190-91, 174 N.E. at 449.
17. Hawkins, Professional Negligence Liability of Public Account-
ants, 12 VA-D. L. REv. 797, 818-19 (1959), criticizes Cardozo's shift to
fraud theory as,
neither desirable nor ... necessary ... because scope of duty
in the negligence formula could have been adapted to the more
restricted limits, while lack of reasonable care, or negligence,
was still retained as the standard for determining breach of
duty.
18. O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S.
758 (1937); State St. Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416
(1938); Duro Sportswear, Inc. v. Cogen, 131 N.Y.S.2d 20 (Sup. Ct. 1954);
Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., [1951] 2 K.B. 164 (C.A.). Duro has
been criticized for its failure to follow Glanzer despite analogous
facts. The defendant auditor knew the purpose of his audit and that
it would be exhibited to one of two shareholders of a corporation.
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Ernst,10 in which the defendant accountants prepared 10 coun-
terparts of an audit for use by their employer to obtain credit.
The defendants knew what the balance sheets would be used
for and also that the plaintiff was one of the lenders expected
to rely on them. In rejecting the claim of liability based on
ordinary negligence, the same court that decided Ultramares
seven years earlier completely disregarded the Glanzer-Ultra-
mares distinction as to the class of reliant parties and found
that no duty was owed this particular plaintiff because of lack
of privity.
20
In suits by third parties claiming reliance on negligent oral
or written misrepresentations by professionals other than
accountants, the Glanzer-Ultramares distinction has often been
followed. Thus, where the reliant class is large, unknown, or
unpredictable, many courts deny liability.21 On the other hand,
where the plaintiff is known and his reliance foreseen, courts
often follow Glanzer and permit recovery. 22
The decision in Rusch Factors is noteworthy as the first
American or English decision which has held an accountant lia-
Bradley, Liability to Third Persons for Negligent Audit, 1966 J. Bus.
LAW 190, 193. See also Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 324, 345 (1957).
19. 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938).
20. Id. at 111, 15 N.E.2d at 418:
We have held [in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche] that in the ab-
sence of contractual relationship or its equivalent, accountants
cannot be held liable for ordinary negligence in preparing a
certified balance sheet even though they are aware that the
balance sheet will be used to obtain credit.
See Investment Corp. v. Buchman, 208 So. 2d 291 (Fla. D.C. App. 1968)
(a decision rejected in Rusch Factors, although clearly of the Glanzer
type).
21. See, e.g., Jaillet v. Cashman, 115 Misc. 383, 189 N.Y.S. 743 (Sup.
Ct. 1921), affd per curiam, 235 N.Y. 511, 139 N.E. 714 (1923) (stock
ticker company); Howell v. Betts, 362 S.W.2d 924 (Tenn. 1962) (sur-
veyor).
22. See, e.g., American Cas. Co. v. Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 223
F. Supp. 539 (E.D. Wis. 1963) (architect); Craig v. Everett M. Brooks
Co., 351 Mass. 497, 222 N.E.2d 752 (1967) (engineering firm). See gen-
erally Bell, Professional Negligence of Architects and Engineers, 12
VAND. L. REV. 711 (1959). An example is the extension of attorneys'
liability to expectant beneficiaries who were eliminated from an inheri-
tance by an attorney's negligence in preparing a will. See Lucas v.
Haem, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685, cert. denied, 368
U.S. 987 (1961); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 650, 320 P.2d 16, 19
(1958). As yet only Connecticut has clearly espoused the California
position. Licata v. Spector, 26 Conn. Supp. 378, 225 A.2d 28 (1968).
It has been strongly rejected in New York. Maneri v. Amodeo, 38 Misc.
2d 190, 238 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. 1963). See Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 1363
(1959). See generally Averill, Attorney's Liability to Third Persons for
Negligent Malpractice, 2 LAiN & WATER L. REv. 379 (1967).
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ble for negligent misrepresentation to a reliant party not in
privity.23 The decision is meritorious for its proper reading of
the precedents, but, unfortunately, the precise rationale of the
court is unclear. In reading its decision the court first dis-
credited Cardozo's fear of unlimited liability and concomitant
privity requirement as an "unwarranted inroad upon the prin-
ciple that '[t] he risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty
to be obeyed.' "24 It was felt that accountants, rather than
innocent reliant parties, should bear the burden of professional
malpractice since, among other reasons, they can spread the
risk through insurance.
Although discrediting the Ultramares rationale, the court
found it unnecessary to overrule the decision. The facts in Rusch
Factors were recognized as "qualitatively distinguishable" from
Ultramares. In the latter the "plaintiff was a member of an
undefined, unlimited class of remote lenders and potential
equity holders not actually foreseen but only foreseeable." In
the instant case plaintiff's complaint was acknowledged by the
court as stating that "the defendant knew that his certification
was to be used for, and had as its very aim and purpose, the
reliance of potential financiers of the Rhode Island corpora-
tion." The court therefore turned to Glanzer for support and
viewed the plaintiff as a "single party whose reliance was actu-
ally foreseen by the defendant." In espousing Cardozo's original
distinction, the court attempted to establish a rule of law to
define the class of third parties to whom accountants owe a
duty of care. The test adopted was whether the third party
plaintiff was actually foreseen and a member of a limited class of
persons.
25
In defining the scope of liability of accountants the Rusch
Factors court recognized that policy considerations other than
compensation of the injured party by the wrongdoer are rele-
vant. It noted, for example, that the ability of accountants to
bear the risk of loss through the use of liability insurance miti-
gated in favor of rejecting the Ultramares rationale and im-
posing liability.26 This conclusion seems overly facile since in-
23. See 284 F. Supp. at 90.
24. Id. at 91.
25. Id. at 92-93.
26. Id. at 91:
Why should an innocent reliant party be forced to carry the
weighty burden of an accountant's professional malpractice?
Isn't the risk of loss more easily distributed and fairly spread
by imposing it on the accounting profession, which can pass the
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surance for accountants is apparently not readily available. In-
surance companies have become greatly alarmed over the rash
of lawsuits against accountants 27 and consequently their rates
for liability coverage of accounting firms have increased almost
to the point of being prohibitive.28 At increased rates the many
small accounting firms and individual accountants certainly
could not obtain adequate coverage. Moreover, those firms
which can afford it will probably spend more money on insur-
ance than is necessary since the amount of their potential lia-
bility is highly uncertain. The apparent result will be large
increases in charges to the public for auditing services causing
them to become unavailable to smaller businesses.
The Rusch Factors court also cites the progress of the ac-
counting profession in terms of both skill and importance to the
community as a justification for extending the scope of liability.29
The responsibilities of the profession have greatly increased, as
third party investors, creditors and the like have come to place
more and more reliance on auditors' reports. Leaders and
writers in the profession are aware of the increased responsi-
bilities and have made proposals to update professional practices
through the promulgation of uniform accounting principles. 30
Despite these developments, the problem remains that many
unsophisticated third party users of accounting reports ascribe
cost of insuring against the risk onto its customers, who can in
turn pass the cost onto the entire consuming public?
27. The New York Times, March 27, 1966, § 3, at 1, col. 3, reported
that approximately 80 lawsuits by investors and creditors had been
filed against public accountants, and the Wall Street Journal, Nov. 15,
1966, at 13, col. 2, reported 100 such pending actions.
28. The typical large accounting firm was thought to carry about
$15,000,000 in insurance in 1960. Wise, The Auditor Has Arrived, Pt. I,
FORTUNE MAGAZINE, Nov., 1960, at 151. However, the Wall Street Jour-
nal, Nov. 15, 1966, at 1, col. 6, reports that many insurance companies
have boosted their rates by 30% or more and others have nearly
stopped writing these policies. Of 15 insurers who wrote coverage rela-
tively freely in 1965, a year later only six handled it as "accommoda-
tion" for big accounts or in a limited manner. Id. at 13, col. 4.
29. See Texas Tunneling Co. v. City of Chattanooga, 204 F. Supp.
821, 833 (E.D. Tenn. 1962), rev'd, 329 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1964); Wyat,
Auditor's Responsibilities, 12 ST. Louis U.L. REv. 331, 339-40 (1967);
Bradley, supra note 18 at 195:
The courts have been markedly solicitous for the accountant's
economic circumstances.... But in the light of the economic
maturity of the independent accounting profession, further de-
pendence on judicial tenderness seems ill-founded.
30. New York Times, Nov. 20, 1966, § 3, at 1, col. 1; see Bradley,
Auditor's Liability and the Need for Increased Accounting Uniformity,
30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 898, 917-18 (1965). See generally Sym-
posium, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 621 (1965).
1969]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
a much higher degree of accuracy and reliability to the state-
ments than is either justified or intended by accountants. 31
Consequently, undue reliance may be placed on financial data,
and when loss does occur it is too often inappropriately
attributed to the inaccuracy of the reports.
Thus it is of great importance to the future of the account-
ing profession clearly to define and analyze the scope of liability
under the Rusch Factors test. The opinion is unclear both as
to the number of financiers who were to examine the financial
statements, and defendant's actual knowledge of the potential
reliance of these financiers. Questions thus arise as to what the
court meant by someone "foreseen" as distinguished from some-
one "foreseeable," 32 and how many constitute a "limited class."
Section 552 of the Restatement of Torts33 and its comments,
which were relied on by the court in Rusch Factors, provide
some guidance.34 Under the Restatement a negligent mis-
31. Wyat, supra note 29, at 338, 344-45. Speaking for his profession
Saul Levy said: "We do not insure, guarantee or warrant the accuracy







Levy, Legal Hazards in Public Accounting, 99 J. ACCOUNTANCY, May,
1955, at 38.
32. According to WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIoNARY
890 (1965), and 17 WORDS AND PHRASES 447-48 (1958), foreseeability
is the ability to "reasonably anticipate" while foreseen refers to antici-
pation more "certain," "probable," "unavoidable," or "likely to happen."
33. (1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or
employment, or in a transaction in which he has a
pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the
guidance of others in their business transactions, is sub-ject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by
their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he
fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in ob-
taining or communicating the information.
(2) ... the liability stated in subsection (1) is limited to
loss suffered
(a) By the person or one of the persons for whose
benefit and guidance he intends to supply the
information, or knows that the recipient intends
to supply it; and(b) Through reliance upon it in a transaction which
he intends the information to influence, or
knows that the recipient so intends, or in a sub-
stantially similar transaction.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966).
34. The court's use of the Restatement indicates its belief that the
Restatement was based on Glanzer. 284 F. Supp. at 91. As will become
apparent from the discussion that follows, the Restatement and its
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representer would be liable to those for whose benefit and
guidance he intended the information or to those to whom he
knew it would be supplied. The defendant need not know the
plaintiff's name and identity;35 it is enough that he knows that
the information is intended to be relayed to a specified group
or class.36 According to the Restatement's series of illus-
trations, 37 an accountant would be liable to an identified class
of banks under section 552, no matter how many potential lend-
ers this might include, if his employer mentioned that he was
seeking to negotiate a loan. On the other hand, liability would
not be imposed on an accountant who was not informed of the
specific use to which his financial reports would be put.
If the Rusch Factors court intended to adopt the Restate-
ment position, the "limited class" of potential plaintiffs "actually
foreseen" describes a broad test with potentially extensive lia-
bility. Thus, on the facts of Rusch Factors, the class might in-
clude all actual financiers of the company since the defendant
knew his statements would be used to obtain financing. Fol-
lowing this rationale, if the company had received financing
from 50 different banks and factors, all of whom saw defendant's
accounting statements, all could hold defendant liable for their
losses. Similarly, the accountants in Ultramares would have
been liable since they knew the balance sheet they supplied
would be used to obtain credit.38
A second possible interpretation of the court's test is that
comments prescribe an extension of liability much broader than Cardozo
intended in Glanzer.
35. RESTATEMENT, supra note 33, at 16.
36. Id., comment h, at 23:
In other words, it is not required that the person who is to
become the plaintiff be identified or known to the defendant as
an individual when the information is supplied. It is enough
that the maker of the representation intends it to reach and in-
fluence either a particular person or persons, known to him, or
a group or class of persons, distinct from the much larger class
who might reasonably be expected sooner or later to have
access to the information, and foreseeably to take some action in
reliance upon it. It is enough, likewise, that the maker of the
representation knows that the recipient intends to transmit the
information to a similar person, persons, or group. It is suffi-
cient, in other words, that the maker knows that the informa-
tion is intended for repetition to a certain group or class of per-
sons, and that the plaintiff proves to be one of them, even
though the maker never had heard of him when the informa-
tion was given.
37. Id. at 24-25. Judge Pettine uses one of the hypotheticals as
support for his decision. 284 F. Supp. at 92.




"actually foreseen persons" refers only to those individual
parties specifically known by name to the defendant, and "lim-
ited class" is restricted to those parties so known. It is very
possible that the plaintiff was the only potential financier of the
Rhode Island corporation and that the defendants knew it. If
such were the case, the decision goes no farther than Glanzer,
and, as precedent, might be limited to cases where the de-
fendant knows the individual reliant parties as well as the "end
and aim of the transaction."
Although language in the opinion would support either of
the above interpretations, the court's rejection of the Ultra-
mares rationale and reliance on the Restatement probably indi-
cates an intent to extend the liability of accountants to third
parties for negligent misrepresentations. 39 The precise limit lies
somewhere between a class composed of parties actually known
by the accountant and one composed of all foreseeable parties.
Where the actual line should be drawn is also a troublesome
question. It is virtually indisputable that accountants should at
least be liable to those whom they actually know will rely on
their reports. As expressed in Glanzer,40 such knowledge
creates a relationship which is nearly contractual despite the
absence of privity. Even with this limited extension of liability
the burdens on accountants may still be large,4 1 but the profes-
sion should assume at least this much responsibility for its re-
ports.
The Restatement position and almost any other intermediate
extension of liability short of the extremity of foreseeability will
subject the accounting profession to potentially large liabilities
from possibly numerous plaintiffs. 42 Attorney fees alone could
39. One indication that the court was thinking in terms of ex-
tensive liability is its concluding statement that it would leave open for
future consideration the question of whether liability "ought to extend
to the full limits of foreseeability." 284 F. Supp. at 93.
Certain authorities have advocated extending liability to the limits
of foreseeability. Texas Tunneling Co. v. City of Chattanooga, 204 F.
Supp. 821, 834 (E.D. Tenn. 1962), rev'd, 329 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1964);
Levitin, supra note 8, at 449; Comment, supra note 14, at 149.
40. See note 11 supra, and accompanying text.
41. The plaintiff in Rusch Factors was claiming an injury in ex-
cess of $121,000.00.
42. It has been suggested that broad liability may be justified by
the facts of certain cases. Meek, supra note 9, at 389:
Moreover, the liability though indeterminate is not totally un-
limited. Recoveries in large amounts would ordinarily ensue
only where there are large discrepancies in the balance sheet;
large inaccuracies would usually indicate a high degree of neg-
ligence so that liability would not seem particularly unjust.
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be enormous in defending such claims. Moreover, there is no
reason to believe that numerous suits will not be brought since
the recent decisions expanding the liability of accountants in
other areas43 have been much publicized.
It seems likely that accountants will seek to protect them-
selves by the use of disclaimers and qualified certificates. They
are convenient, legally acceptable means of protection. Dis-
claimers have, however, been criticized on the ground that they
deny the recipient of the report the very security he seeks,44
they hamper the effectiveness of auditors, 45 they cast adverse
reflections on the credit standing of the client,46 and they are
generally bad for the financial community.47 If the Rusch
Factors decision lays the foundation for potentially large negli-
gence recoveries against accountants, the profession may well
overlook these criticisms in an effort to protect itself.
Perhaps the most practical approach for the accounting pro-
fession is to continue fighting these extended liability cases un-
til it can obtain a relatively clear definition of the duty owed to
third parties. Courts should move very cautiously in extending
liability for professional negligence, allowing the members of
the profession to adjust to any new responsibilities imposed, and
clearly defining the limits or extensions of liabilities applied.
43. See Escott v. BarChris Const. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (accountant liable to investors for misleading data in a prospectus
under Securities Act of 1933); Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.
N.Y. 1967), noted in 52 Mn . L. REV. 910 (1968) (accountants must
publicly disclose after-acquired information relating to an audit they
prepared regardless of their interest in the facts themselves).
44. Seavey, Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co.-Negligent Misrep-
representation, 67 L.Q. REv. 466, 480 (1951).
45. Note, 41 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 588, 599 (1967).
46. Id.
47. Editorial, The Spector of Auditors' Liability, J. AccouNTAxcy,
Sept., 1965, at 33.
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